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Introduction 
    
 
     This thesis, Philosophy on Stage, explores the interaction between pre-Socratic philosophy 
and the Prometheus Bound, a drama normally attributed to Aeschylus1. My aim is to 
investigate the process whereby the dramatist incorporates theoretical contents elaborated 
by early Greek philosophers that are in principle alien to his art. What role do such contents 
play when transposed onstage? And how does the tragedian contribute, through their re-
elaboration, to the intellectual debates of his times? By examining the Prometheus Bound 
against some of the theological, ethical and epistemological notions of the pre-Socratics, this 
thesis aims at shedding new light on the interconnection between drama and contemporary 
philosophical speculation.  
     I have left aside the much-debated question of the authenticity of the play and the trilogy 
to which it belongs, the Prometheia2. Most scholars still accept it as a genuine work of 
Aeschylus (including those of antiquity, who never questioned the authorship of the play), 
and I shall myself proceed on this assumption. I believe in fact that the studies of Herington 
and Saïd have convincingly shown that the Prometheus Bound fits well with the other 
tragedies of Aeschylus, most notably with the Oresteia3: their remarks are to me more 
compelling than the scepticism concerning the alleged stylistic, dramaturgic and theological 
peculiarities of the play4. I am aware, at the same time, that the enigma of this drama is 
doomed to remain unresolved, unless new evidence be found concerning the author, the 
date or the contents of the trilogy. Thus, my choice is mainly methodological, since trying 
to address preliminarily this issue would involve entering an endless philological 
discussion that has been going on for over a century without yielding any definitive proof.  
     In any case, the authorship of the play does not constitute an essential prerequisite for 
the interpretation that will be elaborated in this thesis. By examining the discursive and 
conceptual relationship between the drama and the near-contemporary theorisations of the 
pre-Socratics, it is still possible to reach solid conclusions, at least concerning one aspect of 
the dramatic text. The Prometheus Bound, which one must agree could be the work of 
someone other than Aeschylus, will be approached here as a document recording some of 
the intellectual debates that were animating the Greek world somewhere around the mid-
fifth century. The dating is an approximate one, but one that can be inferred from the 
‘philosophical evidence’ yielded by the play itself. Regardless of when exactly the play was 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank my supervisor, Leopoldo Iribarren, for his precious criticism, support and patience. A 
special mention goes also to Claire Louguet and Daria Francobandiera (from the Classics department of Lille 
III) for having organized and let me intervene in the seminar Eschyle et les Présocratiques: le Prométhée Enchainé, 
which has proved an important source of inspiration for the present work.  
2 For an exhaustive review of the debate, see Griffith, 1977:1-7; Conacher, 1980:141-174 and Saïd, 1985:16-20. 
3 See Herington, 1970:76-87 and Saïd, 1985:326-340. Cf. also Cerri, 1975:106 ff. 
4 A sober yet penetrating review of such criticisms is provided by Lloyd-Jones, 2003:52 ff. 
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composed5, it will emerge that none of the abstractions and philosophical ideas relevant to 
the Prometheus Bound was shaped after that timeframe. 
 
 
I. The interplay of tragedy and philosophy 
 
     Much work has been done in the last decades to bring out the ways in which the action 
of tragedy, through the re-enactment of traditional mythological sagas, helped articulate 
conflicts and tensions within contemporary Greek society. Research on Greek drama, in fact, 
has mainly focused on ‘its social and political content […] or the anthropological and theatrical 
interests of its form’6.  Very little attention, surprisingly, has been drawn to the fact that some 
of the main questions asked on the dramatic stage – What is the nature of the gods? What is 
the relationship between gods and men? – were being asked at that very same time by the 
so-called pre-Socratics, a heterogeneous group of thinkers commonly regarded as the 
fathers of western philosophy. With few exceptions7, the relationship between Greek drama 
and early Greek philosophy has been ‘oddly underexplored’8, and only very recently it has 
started attracting the attention it deserves9. This lacuna becomes especially weighty with 
regards to Aeschylus (525-456 BC), who lived roughly at the same time as Heraclitus, 
Parmenides and Empedocles, and could have easily accessed the older doctrines of 
Xenophanes and Anaximander. In fact, his dramas bear striking similarities with the ideas 
and language of these thinkers10, but this should not surprise us, for Aeschylus was entitled 
as much as them to contribute to the intellectual debates of his days. There has been a long-
standing tendency to regard his relationship with philosophy as a doxographical one: the 
tragic poet, provided he employs ‘philosophy’ at all, would be simply alluding or criticizing 
a given doctrine, taking no part in the elaboration of innovative concepts or notions11. This 
is a picture that does not make any justice to the actual engagement of the dramatist with 
the cultural issues of his society. Of the three Attic tragedians, in fact, Aeschylus is 
undoubtedly ‘le plus théoricien’12, and this is so for two reasons. 
     The first relates to the specificities of the intellectual context in which both the dramatist 
and the pre-Socratics shaped their discourses. At the time when Aeschylus’ tragedies were 
taking shape, Greek culture was not differentiated yet into a variety of specialised 
                                                             
5 The dating oscillates between 479 and 424 BC. See Herington, 1970:127-129. 
6 Hall, 2010:172. Cf. Judet de La Combe, 2010:79-118 and Cairns, 2013:ix. 
7 Here is a list of papers containing important suggestions and questions, most of them begging for further 
developments: Herington, 1963; Capizzi, 1982; Seaford, 1986; Adán, 1999 and Allan, 2005.  
8 Seaford, 2012:240. 
9 Irby-Massie, 2008; Seaford, 2012 and Scapin 2015. 
10 Cf. Allan, 2005; Irby-Massie, 2008:133-135; Griffith, 2009:26-34; Judet de La Combe, 2010:204-212, 252-257 
and Scapin, 2015:3-4. 
11 The statement of Lloyd-Jones (1971:86) is in this sense emblematic: “If Aeschylus knew of modern thinkers 
like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, he refrained from obtruding his knowledge upon his audience”. 
12 Judet de La Combe, 2010:229. 
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disciplines claiming their own expertise, traditions and rules - as will instead be the case by 
the time of Sophocles’ and Euripides’ ἀκµή13. There was not such a thing as a philosophical 
practice as such, neither there were thinkers (such as the Sophists) distinguishing 
themselves from the poets and claiming the control, with their theoretical elaborations, on 
specific subjects of inquiry. If Heraclitus could criticize Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes 
and Hecataeus in the same fragment14, it is because what matters to him is the issues they 
raise rather than the medium by which such issues are raised. With his dramatic language, 
then, Aeschylus could address the theoretical questions of his times without crossing any 
pre-established intellectual boundary: on the contrary, his plays were meant to contribute 
to a shared debate on the Greek system of values and beliefs15. 
     The second reason concerns the relationship of tragedy with other forms of contemporary 
public discourse. Greek drama is an heterogenous art-form, which elaborates its meaning 
through the integration of a variety of literary and performative contents: from epic and 
didactic poetry to choral lyric, from ritual speech-acts to legal prose, the playwright could 
subject every manifestation of the shared culture to his own needs of representation16. The 
originality of the tragic poet lies in his action within and on the culture of his times, which 
enables him to produce artistic innovations while being anchored in pre-existing traditions 
and contemporary practices. Drama synthetises and re-composes these discursive elements, 
and transposes them on the stage to shape the relationship between the characters, their 
individual asses and limits, indeed, the dramatic action itself. In this respect, the notions of 
the pre-Socratics are a fundamental component of this material: the tragedian incorporates 
them not only to shape and dramatize the events of tragedy, but also to elaborate innovative 
notions in different fields of speculative inquiry. In fact, in the Prometheus Bound we read 
the earliest reflection on the origins of civilization, and this suggests that the influence of 
philosophy on drama was as important as that of drama on philosophy. 
     In a collection of papers edited in 2013, Tragedy and Archaic Greek thought, Cairns has 
voiced the urgency to restore the centrality of Greek tragedy in the development of early 
Greek thought17: with this thesis, I aim to offer a contribution to this task.  
 
 
An overview on the scholarly debate 
 
     The only monographic study on the topic is Rösler’s Reflexe vorsokratischen Denkens bei 
Aischylos (1970), which discuss a large selection of Aeschylean passages which might betray 
the influence of the pre-Socratics – in particular, of the Pythagoreans, the medical theorists 
and several individual thinkers. Rösler’s conclusions are mostly negative, except for the 
                                                             
13 Allan, 2005:72 ff. and Judet de La Combe, 252-260, 295 ff. 
14 EGP III, 9, D20. 
15 Cf. Allan, 2005:71-75 and Judet de La Combe, 2010:98-102, 251-255. 
16 Griffith, 2009:6-58 and Judet de La Combe, 2010:245-251. 
17 Cairns, 2013:ix ff. 
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impact, which he acknowledges, of Xenophanes’ and Anaxagoras’ ideas18. However, two 
hermeneutical limits undermine his results. First, Rösler has limited his analysis to 
individual passages of Aeschylus, thereby renouncing to look for general parallelisms in 
thought, diction and structure. Second, he conceives the relationship between drama and 
pre-Socratic thought as an aprioristic influence of the latter on the first. The author implicitly 
accepts the distinction between ‘poetry’ and ‘philosophy’, projecting it onto an historical 
period when no such distinction, as said above, has been drawn yet.  
     In his article on the relationship between Aeschylus and Parmenides, Capizzi has 
advocated a different approach to the topic: “it seems – he observed polemically – that in the 
cities of archaic and classical Greece there was a department of Philosophy that was not part of the 
Faculty of Letters, but had its private hub in a house with no doors nor windows” (my translation)19. 
Although his conclusions rely too heavily on a shaky historical evidence (i.e. Parmenides’ 
biographical tradition20), it remains that Capizzi was the first, to my knowledge, to explicitly 
approach Aeschylus as an active participant to the movements of his times, envisaging his 
influence on Parmenides and contemporary philosophy in general21.  
     Seaford has interpreted, in a recent monograph, the structural and conceptual similarities 
between the cosmology of the Oresteia and that of Heraclitus as an immediate answer to the 
social developments – i.e. the monetisation - of fifth century Greece22. To be sure, the 
continuity between Aeschylus’ and Heraclitus’ cosmology can be understood in relation to 
the society in which they both lived, but Seaford has gone as far as to posit, dogmatically 
enough, a unidirectional causal link between literary (philosophical and dramatic) 
cosmologies and the economic processes of the polis23. In so doing, he reduces complex 
doctrines and dramas to mere reflection of specific relations of productions, thereby 
ignoring altogether the originality of the individual author. Besides, Seaford systematically 
wrenches Aeschylus’ sentences from their dramatic context (as already done by Rösler), and 
so distorts their meaning and the tragic effects they were meant to produce.  
     The last and surely most important contribution to the topic is Scapin’s doctoral 
dissertation, The Flower of Suffering, which investigates ‘the theological tension and metaphysical 
assumptions’24 of the Oresteia against some of the ideas and modes of thought of 
Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Scapin has overcome the 
hermeneutical limits underlying previous researches, and has convincingly shown that the 
tension between opposite religious attitudes emerging from the trilogy can be read as a 
response to the theological debates of the time. The same, we will see, is true for the 
Prometheus Bound, where the oscillation between opposite attitudes follows the line of a 
                                                             
18 For Xenophanes, Rösler, 1970:4-15; for Anaxagoras, ibid.:56-87. 
19 Capizzi, 1982:124. 
20 Cf. Cerri, 1999:49-52 and Coxon, 2009:39-44. 
21 Capizzi:123-125, 131-133.  
22 Seaford, 2012:240 ff.  
23 Cf. the criticism of Scapin, 2015:9-14. 
24 Scapin, 2015:8.  
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dialectic relationship between the archaic world-view and the notions promoted by the pre-
Socratics to challenge it. The conceptual and literary originality of our drama lies, as well, 
in this juxtaposition, whereby different approaches to reality are placed against each other 
and thereby reveal each other’s limits. It follows, as I shall demonstrate in more detail in the 
following section, that to shed a light on the relationship of drama with contemporary 
intellectual debates requires exploring the anchoring of such debates in the pre-existing 
poetic and intellectual traditions. 
 
 
II. Philosophy on Stage: themes and aims 
 
     The fact that the Prometheus Bound stands in a direct relationship to contemporary 
philosophy is no longer a working hypothesis nor a thesis defended by a scholarly minority, 
but an acknowledged fact. Our drama is in fact a ‘lively testament to the Greek intellectual 
achievements of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.E.’25, and Prometheus, its main character, ‘fits 
with great ease the fragments preserved from the archaic thought‘26. Previous researches on the 
topic (in truth a very few), some results of which I share and adopt as the foundations of my 
work27, all fail, however, to account for two fundamental questions, namely, where do the 
themes and topics of the Prometheus Bound come from? And how did the tragedian integrate 
contemporary theoretical discourses to re-elaborate them? Whether elaborated through the 
language of prose, poetry or drama, the early Greek inquiries into divine and human nature 
form a close-knit unity, and the contribution of the individual author is only intelligible 
when placed against the background of a traditional set of problems and solutions.  
 
 
Between philosophy and myth 
 
     This research conceives the relationship between the early Greek thinkers and drama in 
two interrelated ways. The first concerns the continuity between the contents developed in 
drama and in the discourses of the pre-Socratics. The Prometheus Bound touches upon several 
themes that were at the heart of contemporary philosophical inquiries, and only when read 
against them does the tragic text reveal its conceptual complexity and originality.  
                                                             
25 Irby-Massie, 2008:133. Cf. Herington, 1963, 192 ff. 
26 Adán, 1999:8.  
27 I mainly refer to Adán, 1999 which offers some precious observations on the conceptual continuity between 
the dramatic character of Prometheus and the cosmological notions developed by Anaximander, Heraclitus 
and Parmenides. Less satisfying is instead Irby-Massie, 2008, which only lists a series of parallelisms between 
the drama and contemporary thinkers (mainly Heraclitus), overlooking the broader cultural framework in 
which these intellectual trends took shape.  
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     The second way, systematically overlooked by the critics (but by Scapin28), draws 
attention to the fact that both Aeschylus and the early philosophers are largely dependent 
on the same poetical tradition, and elaborate their discourses within and against that 
tradition. A prominent place is occupied, in this sense, by Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and 
Days. These poems were an essential point of reference not only for the pre-Socratics29, who 
challenged and used them as the vehicle of their cosmological (Theogony) and 
anthropological (Works and Days) doctrines, but also for the author of the Prometheus Bound, 
who found there the earliest versions of the myth of Prometheus (Theog. 535-616; WD 47-
105) and built his drama upon them. If the power of this drama relies, as I think, on an 
original reflection over the correlation between divine powers and human conduct, we 
might then wonder how such prominent theme was originally treated by Hesiod, and how 
the challenges offered against it by the pre-Socratics helped the dramatist shaping his own 
tragedy. It is in fact my contention that the continuity between our drama and the pre-
Socratics emerges not only in concepts or language, but also in the critical attitude toward 
the theological and ethical contents of Hesiod’s poetry.  
     In the Theogony, the myth of Prometheus narrates the conflict between Prometheus and 
Zeus; in the Works and Days, it illustrates instead the defining traits of the human condition. 
These two themes – the intra-divine conflict and the nature of man - form the background 
of my research. The thematic approach is to me the only viable method to handle the 
complex material at my disposal. In the first chapter, I will discuss the Hesiodic myths and 
the drama, so to bring to light the essential point of contacts as well as the differences 
between the two. In the second and third chapter, I will instead focus on the literary and 
conceptual continuity between the Prometheus Bound on the one hand, and some fragments 
of Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles on the other: 
hopefully, this thesis will enable me to place the drama within the intellectual milieu in 
which it really belongs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
28 See Scapin, 2015:15 ff. 
29 As already observed by Aristotle in Metaphysics I. 4, 984b and elsewhere. For recent contributions on the 
topic, see, in particular, Vlastos, 1952; Cerri, 1998; Algra, 1999; Most, 2007; Scapin, 2015: 31-34. 
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The myth of Prometheus 
 
The Prometheus Bound is the most symbolic drama of Antiquity. 
Karl Reinhardt 
 
          As acknowledged by Herodotus in his Histories (ca. 450 BC), it was Homer and Hesiod 
who gave the gods their ‘names, honours, skills and forms’ (II, 53), systematising the Greeks’ 
mythological tradition. Hesiod’s myths of Prometheus (a character whom Homer never 
mentions), thus, provided Aeschylus with an anchor, with a set of conceptual and thematic 
categories in which to accommodate his own ideas30. Although other authors and versions 
of the myth influenced the shape of the story narrated in the Prometheus Bound31, the essential 
traits of the story, as we shall see, were those imposed by Hesiod in the Theogony and the 
Works and Days. Starting from this assumption, I will explore the process whereby the 
Hesiodic themes, issues and images are appropriated by the tragedian and used as the 
vehicle toward the elaboration of an original dramatic project.  
 
 
1. Prometheus and Zeus in the Theogony 
 
     Both Hesiod and Aeschylus recognize in Prometheus the god of µῆτις (as his name 
suggests)32, of a type of intelligence based on cunning and deception. Prometheus is the 
foresighted god, he who ‘knows counsels beyond all others’ (πάντων πέρι µήδεα εἰδώς, Theog. 
559; WD 54), who can ‘find a way out even from impossible situations’ (εὑρεῖν κἀξ ἀµηχάνων 
πόρον, Prom. 59). Most importantly, he is the only one god who can challenge Zeus by relying 
on his δολίη τέχνη33. This challenge is the centrepiece of the myth narrated in the Theogony 
and in the Prometheus Bound. In fact, it was the Theogony that provided ‘the starting point for 
Aeschylus’ own approach to the myth of Prometheus’34. I shall then start by examining Hesiod’s 
text, so to bring to light the material relevant to the dramatic action of the Prometheus Bound. 
 
 
The scission 
 
     Hesiod tells how Prometheus, the son of the Titan Iapetus and Clymene (Theog. 506-510), 
first tried to deceive Zeus at Mekone, thereby producing a contest articulated by a series of 
                                                             
30 On the concept of ‘anchoring innovation’, developed by the Dutch classicists, see Sluiter, 2017. 
31 See Griffith, 1977:16-17 and 1983:1-4; Reinhardt, 1991:51-59 and West, 1979:147. 
32 Cf. West, 1966:308-309, n. ad 510 and Griffith, 1983:2 n.5. The essential correspondence between the god’s 
name and actions was accepted throughout Antiquity: cf. Theog. 559 and Prom. 85-87 (with the comments of the 
scholiasts; scholl. 85a-c). I refer to the scholia on the Prometheus Bound as they appear in Herington, 1972. 
33 In the Theogony, µῆτις, δόλος and τέχνη are used interchangeably to signify a ‘skilful deception’; see Saïd, 
1985:115-117 and Iribarren, 2017:58 n.1. 
34 Solmsen, 1949:126. Cf. Conacher, 1980:3-15 and Griffith, 1983:6. 
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ruses and counter-ruses. In a feast to which both gods and men were participating (535), the 
son of Iapetus divided up the nourishment destined to Zeus’ commensals, a sacrificial ox, 
into two unequal portions (536-540), and then tricked Zeus into choosing one of them (548-
549). This ruse, aetiology of the institution of sacrifice35, disturbs the normative system of 
the Olympians, and places Zeus in a paradoxical situation: either of his choices will violate 
the law of partition of which he himself is the guarantee36. The sacrifice trick, in fact, takes 
place within an order that Zeus has already arranged upon the equal (ὁµῶς, 74; ἐὺ, 885) 
distribution of honours and prerogatives among the gods. Prometheus, then, tries to put Zeus 
in contradiction with himself, and he does so, most importantly, by giving an advantage to 
human beings: from then on, they will keep for themselves the edible portions of the sacrificed 
beast, leaving the fat and the bones to the gods. The same issues will be at work in the 
Prometheus Bound. The dramatist will reduce Prometheus’ ruses to a single act of 
transgression, the theft of fire, while at the same time attributing it the symbolic values of the 
Hesiodic sacrifice trick. As soon as Prometheus tries to benefit mankind ‘beyond proper 
measure’ (καιροῦ πέρα, Prom. 507), it is in fact the principle of equality underpinning Zeus’ 
order that is challenged. Different from Hesiod, rather, is the logic underlying the intra-divine 
conflict. But let us consult the Theogony first. 
     After the trick at Mekone, Zeus punishes Prometheus by taking divine fire away from men 
(563-564), making it impossible to cook what they had got from the sacrifice trick. In a last 
attempt to help mortals, Prometheus steals the fire back and gives it to men, hiding it ‘into a 
hollow fennel-stalk’ (ἐν κοίλῳ νάρθηκι, 567)37. At this point, Zeus does not take away fire from 
men, but sends among them a ‘beautiful evil‘ (καλὸν κακὸν, 585), the fabricated woman, who 
embodies the ontological and spatial discontinuity between gods and men (see below)38. In 
the meanwhile Prometheus is defeated and subdued, despite his cleverness, to the constraint 
(ὑπ᾿ἀνάγκης, 615) of a ‘great bond‘ (µέγας δεσµὸς, 616), unable to trick Zeus and escape his 
wrath. After all, the conflict was doomed from the very start to end with the victory of the ‘all 
wise’ Zeus (µητιέτα, 520) over the ‘crook-counselled‘ Prometheus (ἀγκυλοµήτης, 546; WD 48). 
The possession of µῆτις is not a prerogative of Prometheus alone, but a cosmic force, as we 
shall see, that guides divine history toward its τέλος, the reign of Zeus39.  
 
 
Ruse and sovereignty  
 
     In the Theogony, only Kronos, ruler of the cosmos before being dethroned by his son Zeus, 
shares with Prometheus the epithet ἀγκυλοµήτης (18, 473, 495): the correlation between the 
two gods relates to the limits of their µῆτις. In fact, both have been defeated by Zeus, and in 
                                                             
35 See West, 1966: 305-308 n. ad 507-616. 
36 See Judet de La Combe, 1996:285 ff. and Iribarren, 2017:70-71.  
37 Cf. Prom.109-110: ναρθηκοπλήρωτον δὲ θηρῶµαι πυρὸς/πηγὴν κλοπαίαν. 
38 See Vernant, 1985:264-265 and Iribarren, 2017:68-76.  
39 On the teleological perspective of the Theogony, see Judet de La Combe, 1996:270-272; Strauss Clay, 2003:12-
14 and Iribarren, 2017:57-58. 
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both cases this happens because Zeus’ cunning proves superior to theirs. For the Olympian 
did not fail to recognize Prometheus’ ruse (γνῶ ῥ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἠγνοίησε δόλον, 551) and could 
eventually turn it against him, while Kronos was deceived (δολωθείς, 494) by the ruse of 
Gaia and did not realize (οὐδ᾿ ἐνόησε, 488) that Zeus was about to subdue him ‘with guile and 
force’ (τέχνῃσι βίηφί, 496). On the one side of the Olympian king stand in fact 
Κράτος (Power) and Βία (Force), sons of Styx, who follow Zeus and raise his authority above 
that of every other god (385 ff.). On the other stands the daughter of Tethys and Ocean: 
Μῆτις, ‘she who knows the most among gods and mortals’ (887). In the Prometheus Bound, the 
character of Μῆτις will be deliberately ignored, and Prometheus himself will take up her role. 
It is then necessary to analyse the function that the notion embodied by the goddess covers 
in the Theogony, for the divergence between Hesiod and the dramatist only emphasizes the 
prominent place recognized by both authors to that type of intelligence that the Greeks called 
by the name of µῆτις. 
     Right after the repartition of the privileges and honours among the gods (885), Zeus 
marries Μῆτις, and then swallows her before she could give birth to Athena - ‘deceiving her 
with guile and treacherous words‘ (δόλῳ…ἐξαπατήσας αἱµυλίοισι λόγοισιν, 889-890). It is at 
this point that he becomes a god µητιέτα and acquires knowledge of the ‘eternal plans’ 
(ἄφθιτα µήδεα, 545, 550, 561) on which his rule depends. The marriage with Μῆτις, in fact, 
endows Zeus with a security measure against the unexpected, and this is what differentiates 
him from the previous rulers. The set of skills embodied by the goddess – and by Prometheus 
himself in the Prometheus Bound - is the functional complement of sovereignty, one of its 
essential conditions40: it is through guile that Zeus takes power41 and stops the chain of 
political and cosmic crisis undermining the divine world. In fact, if the marriage with Μῆτις 
enables Zeus to establish a new order, the following marriage with Θέµις (901 ff.), the 
goddess of divine justice, makes his decisions to be perceived as immutable42. This union 
will in fact give birth not only to Justice (Δίκη), Lawfulness (Εὐνοµίη) and Peace (Εἰρήνη), 
but also to the Destinies (Μοῖραι) - in sum, all the aspects of continuity, regularity and stability 
that Zeus’ power embodies. The image of Prometheus in chains held down by ‘the decree of 
Necessity’ (ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης, 615) is the image of an order that cannot be any longer changed nor 
challenged. We will see that the dramatist, while adopting Hesiod’s plot, values and issues, 
will elaborate a different system of oppositions between Zeus (κράτος and βία) and 
Prometheus (µῆτις and θέµις), thereby erasing every trace of the teleological narrative 
elaborated in the Theogony and challenging the traditionally accepted connection between 
Zeus and the fixed order of a superior necessity. 
 
 
 
                                                             
40 Cf. Detienne and Vernant, 1974:61-75; Cerri, 1975: 101-102 and Saïd, 1985:261-262. 
41 Cf. the description of the Titanomachy in the Prometheus Bound (206-213). 
42 Cf. Solmsen, 1949:35; Detienne and Vernant, 1974:104-106 and Saïd, 1985:278-279. 
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Toward the Works and Days 
 
     The conflict produced at Mekone is the last of the divine history, and preludes to the 
definitive establishment of the Olympian rule. Prometheus’ final release at the hands of the 
mortal Heracles (526-534), son of Zeus and Alcmene, signals in fact the definitive re-
conciliation among the gods, and the achievement of a reigning order among them. At the 
same time, the final intervention of a mortal suggests that there also exists a correlation 
between the divine history and the existence of mortals. The myth of Prometheus, in fact, 
unfolds in the Theogony – as later in the Prometheus Bound - in two distinct yet connected 
directions: the first is the conflict between Zeus and Prometheus, the second is the relation of 
human beings to this conflict. For the trick of Mekone introduces a crisis within Zeus’ order, 
but at the same time achieves a process of ontological differentiation (ἐκρίνοντο, 535)43 
between gods and men: a process that certainly puts men at disadvantage, breaking off every 
form of direct communication with the divine world, but that also endows them with a 
providential function in relation to the gods’ history44. It will in fact be a mortal who finally 
releases Prometheus ‘not against Zeus’ will’ (οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνὸς, 529), thus enabling Zeus to 
achieve a state of harmony that no divine conflict had managed to reach.  
     In the Theogony, then, the origin of mankind is posited as the result of a rupture between 
two types of being separated by mortality. The perspective changes in the Works and Days, 
where the myth of Prometheus does not explain the polarity between gods and men, but 
the essential traits of the human condition itself. In fact, many recent studies have shown 
how Hesiod could approach the myth from opposite perspectives and adjust it to fit the 
very different contexts in which it appears45. In order for us to grasp the plurality of themes 
and semantic nuances underlying the verses of the Prometheus Bound, it is first necessary to 
draw attention to Hesiod’s double telling, to the questions raised by each version of the 
myth. The discursive relationship between Hesiod and the dramatist, we will see, does not 
merely relate to the re-elaboration of the narrative of the Theogony, but to the active 
engagement with a world-view that the Theogony alone cannot bring to light. For the 
Prometheus Bound centres on the order of the gods, but also investigates the place of men 
within that order. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43 On the meaning of κρίνω in this passage, see Reinhardt, 1991:258; Judet de La Combe, 1996:272-273; Strauss 
Clay, 2003:101 and Most, 2006:46 n. 27. 
44 See Judet de La Combe, 1996:269-274 and Iribarren 2016:68-70.  
45 Calabrese de Feo, 1995; Judet de La Combe and Larnoud, 1996; Strauss Clay, 2009:104-128 and Iribarren, 
2017:67-81. The previous tendency, rooted in the structuralist essays of Vernant (1974:185 ff.; cf. 1985:186), was 
instead to emphasize the unity and coherence between the two versions of the myth.  
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II. The human condition 
 
     While the contents of the Theogony were the exclusive prerogative of the Muses, who can 
tell either true things (ἀληθέα, 28) or ‘lies identical with true things‘ (ψεύδεα…ἐτύµοισιν 
ὁµοῖα, 27), in the Works and Days it is the poet who ‘will proclaim some reliable truths‘ (ἐτήτυµα 
µυθησαίµην, 10) to his brother Perses. Such truths concern not the gods but the human 
condition, whose defining trait Hesiod identifies in the inextricability of work and justice46. 
This truth is deduced at the beginning of the narrative from two complementary stories: the 
myth of Prometheus (47-105) and that of the five races (109-201). The first explains men’s 
necessity to work for a living, the second presents the necessity to observe justice as the only 
way for the present race of men, the Iron race, to oppose decadence and avoid the annihilation 
that has befallen the previous races of men. The two λόγοι are closely interconnected, as they 
are both based on the idea that the human condition is the result of a decline which can only 
be relieved through work and justice. It is in function of this ethical programme that the myth 
of Prometheus is narrated in the Works and Days.  
     Neither the punishment nor the release of Prometheus is mentioned in the Works and 
Days, since no interest emerges along the narrative for the role played by mankind in 
relation to the gods’ history. What concerns Hesiod here is the impact of the intrigue 
between Zeus and Prometheus on the life of mortals, henceforth doomed to a life of toil in 
opposition to the blissful condition enjoyed before Prometheus’ intervention on their behalf. 
In the beginning, in a period that closely resembles the Golden age (109-126), men lived on 
earth apart from evils (90-92; cf. 112-113), and knew no opposition between work and fertility 
(43-46; cf. 116-118). But now they must produce their own means of life, and this is the direct 
consequence of Prometheus’ trick against Zeus: 
 
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάµενος φρεσὶν ᾗσιν, 
ὅττί µιν ἐξαπάτησε Προµηθεὺς ἀγκυλοµήτης.47  
 
The episode of the sacrifice trick at Mekone, which was described at length in the Theogony 
(535-561), is here condensed in a single verse (ὅττί…ἀγκυλοµήτης): the myth elaborated in 
the Works and Days does not account for the separation between gods and men, but 
presupposes it as its starting point48. The poet will now focus on the human condition itself, 
and on the episodes of the myth bearing direct consequences on it, namely the theft of fire 
and the creation of the first woman.  
 
 
 
                                                             
46 See Judet de La Combe and Larnoud, 1996:301, Strauss Clay, 2003:31-38 and Most, 2006:xxxvii-xliii. 
47 WD 47-48: ‘But Zeus hid it [sc. βίον (‘the resources of life’) 42], angry in his heart because Prometheus, the 
crook-counselled, beguiled him’. 
48 Cf. Calabrese de Feo, 1995:108 n. 22 and Judet de La Combe, 1996:274. 
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The meanings of fire 
 
     In the Theogony, Prometheus’ stealing is an act of deception - ‘but the good son of Iapetus 
fooled (ἐξαπάτησεν) him’ (Theog. 565) – whereby men are given back what Zeus had 
removed from them. When describing the stolen fire, Hesiod emphasizes the qualitative gap 
between the ’far-seen shining of tireless fire’ (566) which Zeus has forbidden to men and the 
perishable flame that men have at their disposal (569): in brief, two different fires which 
symbolize the spatial and ontological distance between immortals and mortals49. In the 
Works and Days, instead, the theft of fire is clearly presented as a transgression in the interest 
of mortals and to the detriment of Zeus - ‘but the good son of Iapetus stole (ἔκλεψε) fire back for 
human beings (ἀνθρώποισι) from the wise Zeus (Διὸς παρὰ µητιόεντος)’ (50-51). In other 
words, the theft of fire is the action that defines the relationship of Prometheus, Zeus and 
human beings to each other. Not only Prometheus but also men – Zeus says explicitly (56) 
– will be penalised for this offence. The son of Iapetus is bound in ‘painful bonds‘ (δεσµοῖς 
ἀργαλέοισι, Theog. 522) and Pandora is sent in the world of men, there to counterbalance 
fire and fill human life with ‘painful maladies’ (νούσων τ᾿ ἀργαλέων, 92). In the Theogony, fire 
is important to men because without it they cannot sacrifice to the gods. In the Works and 
Days, the Promethean fire is inextricably linked to the βιός which Zeus has withdrawn from 
men, and represents a tool on which their survival depends50.  
     In conclusion, the comparison between the fire of the Theogony and the fire of the Works 
and Days will help us informing the complex notion of fire later developed in the Prometheus 
Bound. The πῦρ πάντεχνον51 of drama will be at once a human and a divine element, and 
the stealing of fire will accordingly acquire a twofold meaning. Among the gods, it is the 
action that arouses Zeus’ wrath and leads to the binding of Prometheus: among men, it 
stands instead for the beginning of civilization, for the shift toward rational modes of living. 
This contrast, we shall see, is what makes Prometheus a tragic character.  
 
 
Hope, or the ambiguity of human life 
 
     Even the creation of the first woman takes on a different meaning in the Works and Days52. 
A nameless work of art in the Theogony, where she symbolises the polarity between gods and 
men, the woman re-appears here as Pandora, embodiment of the paradoxical nature of 
human life. Her name underlines in fact the contrast between her deceptive outlook and her 
true nature: seemingly, she is the beautiful gift fabricated by all the Olympians (80-82), but in 
truth she will consume men’s resources and waste the products of their toil. Her appearance 
among men institutes the essential ambiguity of their condition: from now on, men will 
                                                             
49 Iribarren, 2017:72-73. 
50 Cf. Vernant, 1985:186-189, Saïd, 1985:118-119 and Strauss Clay, 2003:119. 
51 Prom. 7. Cf. 110-111.  
52 See Calabrese de Feo, 1995; Judet de La Combe and Lernould, 1996 and Iribarren, 2017 :77-81. 
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constantly ‘embrace their own evils’ (58). With the opening of the jar (94-95), Pandora spreads 
all sorts of evils into the world. Only Ἐλπίς does not fly out, as Pandora closes the opening 
before it could escape, ‘in accordance with the plans of Zeus’ (βουλῇσι Διὸς, 99). The meaning 
of Hope has puzzled generations of commentators, who have taken pain to understand 
whether Ἐλπίς represents a good or an evil53. The truth is that Hope is neither of them, but 
rather an illusion, itself representative of the ambiguity of human life.  
     As Prometheus is held back by ‘inextricable bonds‘ (ἀλυκτοπέδῃσι, Theog. 521)54 and forced 
to a dire immobility, so is Hope confined within an ‘unbreakable home’ (ἐν ἀρρήκτοισι 
δόµοισιν, 96) and provides men with the means to perpetuate their own inevitable penalty: 
that is, an existence constantly battered by the afflictions that Zeus has imposed on them 
through Pandora. Because of Prometheus, human beings now bear a miserable existence: 
Hope is for them the only way to avert the gaze from their ‘countless sorrows‘ (µυρία λυγρὰ, 
100). It goes very differently in the Prometheus Bound, as I will show in more detail below. The 
notion of hope will appear there as the first of Prometheus’ gifts to men (Prom. 250-251), as a 
φαρµακόν that enables them to achieve civilization by undertaking activities looking to ends 
beyond the limits of their mortality. Hesiod’s Hope represents instead the permanent 
expectation of a future doomed to be negative, essential trait of an existence that defines itself 
in opposition the golden Age, when men ‘lived like gods, with no sorrow in their spirit’ (112).  
 
 
From myth to drama 
 
     There was a time, under the rule of Kronos, in which men could rely on the fruits that 
the earth would give them ‘spontaneously‘ (αὐτοµάτη, WD 118). But now their means of 
living are kept hidden by the gods - κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν (WD 42), 
and their survival is constantly threatened by the maladies coming upon them ‘of their own 
will’ (αὐτόµαται, 103). Such were the dire consequences of Prometheus’ affection toward 
mortals. Although the reasons behind the god’s φιλανθρωπία are never explained in the 
ancient treatments of the myth55, it is the benevolent attitude toward human beings that 
leads Prometheus to transgress the orders of Zeus and question the limits imposed on 
human beings. The same is true for the Prometheus Bound, where Prometheus and Zeus come 
to conflict because of human beings, because the consideration shown to men leads 
Prometheus to encroach upon the divine privilege of fire. What changes, from epic to tragedy, 
is the consequence of this encroachment, both within the divine and the human world.  
     The Hesiodic fire, instrument of sacrifice and symbol of men’s inherent imperfections, is in 
the Prometheus Bound a ‘great resource’ (µέγας πόρος, 111) that paves the way for the 
achievements of the human mind. To human beings, the theft of fire represents the 
                                                             
53 The main views are discussed by Saïd, 1985:122-130. 
54 Cf. Prom. 5-6: ὀχµάσαι…ἐν ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις, 155: δεσµοῖς ἀλύτοις…πελάσας. 
55 Cf. West, 1966:306 n. ad 507-616 and Griffith, 1983:2. 
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foundational act of civilization. To the Olympians, though, Prometheus’ action merely 
represents the encroachment of a divine privilege, a challenge to Zeus’ apportionment of 
honours to the gods. This is precisely why the god is bound, ‘so that he might be taught to love 
Zeus’ tyranny (τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδα) and forget his philanthropic attitude 
(φιλανθρώπου…τρόπου)’ (10-11). Prometheus has in fact gone ‘beyond justice’ (πέρα δίκης, 
30) and his punishment assumes, in principle, the meaning of a just measure against a 
‘criminal’ (λεωργὸν, 5). And yet such punishment is ‘a painful view for the eyes to stare at‘ 
(θέαµα δυσθέατον ὄµµασιν, 69), it is a ‘sight that brings shame on Zeus‘ (Ζηνὶ δυσκλεὴς θέα, 
243). Through the representation of Prometheus in chains, Hesiod could glorify the wisdom 
of Zeus. In the drama, this image conveys instead the concrete representation of a τυραννίς, 
of a normative system based on constriction and violence rather than wisdom and equality56. 
The Prometheus of drama is as distant from the one of Hesiod as it is the tyrant whom he 
challenges onstage. Adversary of Zeus, the Prometheus of the Theogony is a trickster 
legitimately punished; the one of drama is instead the victim of an unjustifiable harshness.  
 
 
III. The tyrant and the sophist 
 
      It constantly emerges from the drama that Zeus, whom Hesiod portrayed as the dispenser 
of justice, is a despot ‘who keeps justice by his side’ (παρ᾿ ἑαυτῷ/ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων, 186-187). His 
agents are Κράτος - the power grounded in a legal authority that is here synonym with 
autocratic behaviour - and Βία - the brute force, material support of power, violence that 
needs not justify itself. We have seen that Zeus, in the Theogony, would be accompanied by 
Κράτος and Βία, but would also marry Μῆτις and Θέµις to incorporate the positive values 
the two goddesses embody. In the drama, such values stand on the side Prometheus, ‘god 
with proud thoughts (αἰπυµῆτα)57, son of right-counselling Themis’ (18). Whatever asset was 
traditionally assigned to Zeus the tragedian attributes to his enemy through the symbolic re-
elaboration of Hesiod. The opposition between the two gods takes then the form of an 
antithetical relationship between the complementary conditions of power. Zeus, the violent 
autocrat who governs without any form of shared authority (ἀθέτως κρατύνει, 150) stands 
against the son of Θέµις and the god of µῆτις: these are the two values on which the stability 
of the cosmos depends58.  
     But the re-elaboration of the Hesiodic characters goes further, since Prometheus equates, 
later in the play, Themis with Gaia (209-210). Even though Themis was traditionally held to 
be Gaia’s daughter59, the identification between the two goddesses is not unattested in 
                                                             
56 On the political overtones of the drama, cf. Cerri, 1975:15-22; Lloyd-Jones, 1971:84 ff.; Saïd, 1985:284-291 and 
Reinhardt, 1991:62-68. 
57 αἰπυµήτης is an hapax in Greek literature, and seems to emphasize not the contrast (thus Griffith, 1983:86 
n. ad 18) but the strict correlation between Prometheus’ pride and Themis’ ὀρθοβουλία, cf. schol. 18e. 
58 The cosmological value of Θέµις is particularly prominent in Parmenides, who presents the perfection of 
Being as the result of a norm, a law (EGP V, 19, D8, 37): ‘it is established (θέµις) that what is be not incomplete’. 
59 Theog. 135. Cf. Aeschylus, Eumenides, 1-4. 
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ancient cultic practices60. No one before Aeschylus, however, seems to have made 
Prometheus their son, elevating him to the rank of Titan61. ‘Promethean’ and ‘Titanic’ are 
nowadays synonym of a spiritual disposition that was for the first time expressed in the 
Prometheus Bound. Every modern version of the myth, from Goethe and Shelley through 
Camus and Pavese, is directly derived from the character of drama: it was Aeschylus who 
transformed the Hesiodic impostor into an intellectual pioneer and a symbol of the struggle 
to assert one’s self against the external forces hostile to him. It is left to understand the reason 
behind this metamorphosis, and its incidence on the dramatic action. 
 
 
In between past and future 
 
     The traditional lineage attributed to Prometheus – his father was the Titan Iapetus, his 
mother Clymene (Theog. 506-510) - implied the disconnection of his vicissitudes from the 
preceding episodes of divine history. It is only with Aeschylus that Prometheus finds himself 
involved in the conflict between Zeus and the Titans. In fact, Zeus overpowers the Titans 
because Prometheus shares with him the ‘subtle tricks’ (αἱµύλας δὲ µηχανὰς, 206) that the 
Titans, his brothers, had previously disdained despite Gaia’s prophecy that the final victory 
will be determined by guile (δόλῳ, 213). It is at this point, once the Titans have decreed their 
own defeat, that Prometheus joins forces with Zeus by mutual agreement (ἑκόνθ᾿ ἑκόντι, 
218) helping him to end the Titanomachy and seize universal power. It is still Prometheus, 
after the battle, who distribute the honours (γέρα, 439) among the gods, fulfilling the 
foundational act of Zeus’ sovereignty. The Titan, in virtue of his kinship with Themis, takes 
over a fundamental political function that was traditionally carried out by Zeus himself. In 
the Theogony, it was in fact the Olympian who delimited, after the Titanomachy, the action 
of each god within specific boundaries (885), rewarding his allies ἣ θέµις ἐστίν (Theog. 396) 
- that is, in accordance with what ‘is and has always been right, proper and common practice’62. In 
the Prometheus Bound, instead, Zeus fully depends on Prometheus’ spiritual assets. It is the 
Titan who helps the future ruler outwitting the Titans, it is him who integrates all the gods 
within the new-established cosmic order. Once the most valuable minister of Zeus, 
Prometheus is now the victim of his unjustifiable harshness – ‘for there is a sickness inherent 
in tyranny, that of mistrusting friends’ (224-225). 
     But Prometheus, as the son of Gaia, also appropriates the prophetic knowledge of the 
goddess, which in Hesiod’s poem had helped Zeus not only to overpower the Titans, but also 
to escape the danger coming from the marriage with Μῆτις (882-888). In this sense, there is 
a functional equivalence with Themis, who is Gaia’s successor on the prophetic throne at 
Delphi, as we read in Aeschylus’ Eumenides (1-4). In Pindar’s eighth Isthmian Ode, moreover, 
it is the ‘wise-counselling’ (εὔβουλος, 31) Themis who warns Zeus (and Poseidon) not to 
                                                             
60 See Groeneboom, 1928:133-134 n. ad 209-211; Cerri, 1975:24 and Saïd, 1985:190 n. 24. 
61 As first suggested by Reinhardt, 1991:58-59, 268-272. Cf. Saïd, 1985:189-192. 
62 Solmsen, 1949:35. Cf. Theog. 74,885. 
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marry Thetis, since she would bear ‘a son mightier than his father’ (φέρτερον πατέρος, 32). 
The same dynamic is at work in the drama, where Prometheus announces that Zeus will fall 
because of a marriage from which a son ‘mightier than his father’ (φέρτερον πατρός, 768) will 
be born63. At the beginning of the play, the tragedian seems to be following the Hesiodic 
pattern of an unequal contest between the invincible ruler and the petty rebel. Such is the 
meaning of Prometheus’ conscious fault (ἑκὼν ἑκὼν ἥµαρτον, 266): his ἁµαρτία has no 
moral implications, but only indicates the offence toward a stronger adversary64. Toward the 
end of the drama, however, the outcome of the conflict seems no longer self-evident, for 
Prometheus holds a secret on which the stability of the tyrannical regime depends. His 
punishment gradually becomes an interrogation, a torture whereby Zeus seeks to extort this 
information from him. This is where the essence of the deadlock between Zeus and 
Prometheus lies, in a prophetical knowledge that gradually transforms the Titan’s suffering 
into a symptom of Zeus’ vulnerability: 
 
νέον νέοι κρατεῖτε, καὶ δοκεῖτε δὴ 
ναίειν ἀπενθῆ πέργαµ᾿. οὐκ ἐκ τῶνδ᾿ ἐγὼ 
δισσοὺς τυράννους ἐκπεσόντας ᾐσθόµην;65     
 
There is no secure power among the Olympians, but only illusory belief (δοκεῖτε). The image 
of the µητιέτα who knows exactly what is going to happen has made space to a ruler who 
will fall because of his ‘empty-headed decisions’ (κενοφρόνων βουλευµάτων, 762). It is 
Prometheus who now possesses an insight into the future in virtue of his symbolic 
relationship with Themis-Gaia: oracular knowledge is the name of a titanic consciousness 
that cannot be subjugated with the mere force. Is the tyrant stronger than the Titan or vice 
versa? This is the question in which the very essence of the Prometheus Bound lies.  
     Zeus never appears onstage, but manifests itself through the voices of his devotes Power, 
Violence and, in the final episode of the drama, Hermes. His adversary, Prometheus, occupies 
instead the scenic foreground throughout the whole drama. The relationship between the two 
gods takes the form of an antithesis, of a scission that extends to every aspect of reality - visible 
and invisible, knowledge and force, Tartarus and Olympus. Only two mutually exclusive 
solutions are conceded: either Prometheus is released, or Zeus will lose his tyrannical throne66. 
When the drama ends, however, we are still left wondering what choice will Zeus make. 
Prometheus refuses to reveal his secret and is cast down to Tartarus, while Zeus’ fall seems 
                                                             
63 Chronological and textual evidence make Pindar a likely source for the dramatist. Cf. Conacher, 1980:15-16; 
Saïd, 1985:190 and Reinhardt, 1991:58-60. However, it is also possible that Aeschylus simply re-elaborated the 
mytheme developed by Hesiod in the episode of Μῆτις (so Bollack, 2006:88 nn. 10-11). 
64 See Saïd, 1978:96-107, 318 ff. Only when pronounced by his enemies Κράτος (9) or Hermes (ἐξαµαρτόντα, 
945) does ἁµαρτία entail a moral fault, i.e. the transgression of the established order. 
65 Prom. 955-957. ‘You just came to power but you think you live in a citadel free from grief. Have I not seen 
two rulers falling from it?’. Cf. Prom. 169-171, 755-756, 907 ff. 
66 Prom. 755-756: νῦν δ’ οὐδέν ἐστι τέρµα µοι προκείµενον/µόχθων, πρὶν ἂν Ζεὺς ἐκπέσῃ τυραννίδος. 
20 
 
to be imminent. The cosmos itself plunges into a state of primordial chaos (1080-1093), 
disturbed by a conflict in which both contestants seem doomed to lose. 
     To be sure, the Prometheia will end with the re-conciliation between Zeus and Prometheus. 
Prometheus himself, in our drama, is sure that ‘one day he [sc. Zeus] will reach a friendly 
agreement (ἀρθµὸν…καὶ φιλότητα) with me, as eager for it as I will be (σπεύδων σπεύδοντί)’67. 
However large was the compositional freedom they enjoyed, dramatists had to develop 
their dramas within the limits imposed by the traditional version of the myth in question68.  
In the same way as in the Theogony, Prometheus will be released by Heracles and Zeus will 
keep on ruling over gods and men69. And yet this certainty, this Ἀνάγκη that drives gods 
and mortals toward an established end, only serves to emphasize the feeling of profound 
instability, political and cosmic at once, that lies at the core of the Prometheus Bound.  
 
 
IV. Prometheus φῐλάνθρωπος 
  
     In Hesiod’s versions of the myth, a strict correlation was established between the 
punishment of Prometheus and the decadence of mankind. The god transgresses the orders 
of Zeus and human beings are the beneficiary of such transgression: both must then pay 
retribution to re-establish a balance within Zeus’ order. If Zeus is called the ‘father of men and 
gods‘ (πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε)70, this is because both are subjected to his will and define 
their existence in relation to it. The same principle, Δίκη, underpins in fact the divine and 
the human world, and whoever trespasses it will be punished71. Thanks to Prometheus men 
possess fire, but because of him they are also doomed to a life of never-ending hardship: 
‘therefore it is not possible to escape the mind of Zeus’ (Theog. 613; cf. WD 105) - this is what we 
learn from a myth in which Prometheus’ punishment and men’s decay are the 
complementary aspects of Zeus’ universal justice. No such correlation is drawn by 
Aeschylus, who rather emphasizes the contrast between what Prometheus has done for 
human beings and what he has caused to himself by helping them72. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
67 Prom. 190-192. Cf. for the expression ἀρθµὸν καὶ φιλότητα, Griffith, 1983:123, n. ad 191, 192 and Bollack, 1965-
1969 (III:1):230. 
68 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 1453b 22-23.  
69 On Heracles’ intervention, cf. Prom. 770-774 and 871-875. Structure and development of the Prometheia have 
been the object of a long discussion. Among the most significant contributions, see Herington, 1970:76-87, 123-
126; Lloyd-Jones, 1971:97-102; Griffith, 1977:13-18; Conacher, 1980:98-119 and Reinhardt, 1991:78-83. 
70 Theog. 468, 542, 643, 838; WD 59. 
71 See Lloyd-Jones, 1971:32-36 and 2003:51-52; Allan, 2006 and Scapin, 2015:24 ff. Cf. WD 238-247, 280-285 and 
Plato, Protagoras 322d. 
72 Prom. 109-113, 267-268. 
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The gifts of Prometheus 
 
     If the divine world within which the Titan’s suffering takes place is affected by Zeus’ 
lawlessness, the human reality conveys instead the manifestation of the goodwill (εὔνοια, 
446) that makes Prometheus so different from his opponent. No matter how harsh his 
punishment is or will be, his benefits to mankind are untouched. For human beings are now 
in possession of many technical and intellectual skills, and this they owe to Prometheus alone. 
Once responsible for men’s decadence, the god is now the ‘common benefactor‘ (κοινὸν 
ὠφέληµα, 613) of mankind. Not only he has ‘rescued mortals from going to Ades‘ (235-236), he 
is also responsible for the awakening of their spirit: 
 
ἀκούσαθ᾿, ὥς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν 
ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους.73 
 
At the beginning, i.e. before Prometheus’ intervention, men were νήπιοι. Wanderers with 
no end, condemned to mental infancy (νηπίους) qua unable to understand the surrounding 
reality. They could not make sense of what they saw and heard, nor they knew anything 
about the basic skills of human civilization – farming, building, writing, all this was 
unknown to human beings, who rather lived like beasts, holed up in caves ‘like tiny ants’ (452-
453), ignoring every form of social organization. They were still relegated to the state of 
nature, and their life was not different from that of other living creatures. Inherently unjust 
toward each other, and doomed to disappear because of their feebleness74. Zeus, as soon as 
he sat on the Olympian throne, planned in fact to annihilate and substitute them with a 
whole new human race (231-233). Aeschylus alludes here to the Hesiodic myth of the five 
races, where it is said that the present human race is doomed to disappear at Zeus’ hands 
unless they practice justice and work75. But the truth is that the tragedian has completely 
refashioned the traditional story.  
 
 
Fall and rise of mankind 
 
      The legend of the five races was employed by Hesiod to emphasize the general decline of 
his own times, but also to explain why it is necessary for men to observe justice. Only by 
respecting the laws of Zeus, it is said, there might be a possibility for men to oppose decadence 
and escape a gloomy destiny. Unlike other animal species, men can stop harming each other 
                                                             
73 Prom. 443-444: ‘Listen [sc. to the miseries of mortals], how silly they were before I gave them intelligence and 
understanding’. 
74 In the Platonic myth of Prometheus, Zeus sends Hermes to bring αἰδώς and δίκη among men, so that they 
can live in ‘civic communities’ (πόλεων κόσµοι, Prot. 322c) and protect themselves from the threats posed by 
other animals (ibid.).  
75 WD 180: ‘But even this race of speech-endowed men Zeus will destroy (ὀλέσει)’. 
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because they partake of Zeus’ δίκη, whence Hesiod’s exhortation to Perses: ‘but you listen to 
Justice […]. For Justice is not among them [sc. the animals], but to men Zeus gave Justice, which is 
by far the best’ (WD 275, 278-279). But the violent tyrant of the Prometheus Bound, we have 
seen, has nothing to do with Hesiod’s dispenser of Justice. Neither does Prometheus’ 
description of mankind takes the form of a moral reproach (µέµψιν οὔτιν᾿ ἀνθρώποις ἔχων, 
445): rather, what the Titan emphasizes is the contrast between man as he once was and man 
as he has become after his own intervention. Hence, Zeus’ plan to destroy mankind cannot 
be related to men’s lawless conduct, as Hesiod did: it was a whim, a demonstration of 
ruthless and arbitrary power. For men were about to ‘be smashed’ (διαρραισθέντας, 236), to 
be annihilated (ἀιστώσας, 232) like the mighty beings ruling before Zeus (151), victims of a 
violence that knows no boundaries76. Be that as it may, Prometheus, alone among the gods, 
dares to oppose Zeus’ plan, and ensures men’s survival. He then proceeds to give them hope 
and fire, the means whereby they can realise themselves under the tyranny of the new gods: 
 
ΠΡ. θνητούς γ᾿ ἔπαυσα µὴ προδέρκεσθαι µόρον. 
ΧΟ. τὸ ποῖον εὑρὼν τῆσδε φάρµακον νόσου; 
ΠΡ. τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατῴκισα. 
ΧΟ. µέγ᾿ ὠφέληµα τοῦτ᾿ ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς. 
ΠΡ. πρὸς τοῖσδε µέντοι πῦρ ἐγώ σφιν ὤπασα 
ΧΟ. καὶ νῦν φλογωπὸν πῦρ ἔχουσ᾿ ἐφήµεροι;  
ΠΡ. ἀφ᾿ οὗ γε πολλὰς ἐκµαθήσονται τέχνας.77 
 
Before manifesting the plenitude of his benefits to mankind (442-506), Prometheus does not 
boast but of two gifts, the blind hopes (τυφλὰς ἐλπίδας) and the flaming fire (φλογωπὸν 
πῦρ). Here lies, in the inclusion of hope among Prometheus’ benefits to mankind, a crowning 
example of the way in which the tragedian has re-elaborated the Hesiodic material. For in the 
Works and Days Ἐλπίς was given to men by Zeus, through Pandora, in order for them to 
endure the illnesses (νοῦσοι, 102) befalling them ‘in silence (σιγῇ), because Zeus took their voice 
[sc. of the maladies] away‘ (104). Hope stands there at the very end of a process of decadence, 
it represents its culmination. First came Pandora, who marks the beginning of a precarious 
and ambiguous existence, then came Hope, defining trait of this condition. The tragedian, 
instead, ignores Pandora and the jar, and presents hope as a remedy (φάρµακον), as the first 
great benefit (µέγ᾿ ὠφέληµα) that Prometheus gives to mortals. A beneficent blindness, hope 
is what keeps men from anticipating death (προδέρκεσθαι µόρον) and despairing of their 
present life. The Hesiodic Ἐλπὶς, which was strictly associated to the punishment of men, is 
now translated into a spiritual benefit that coincides with the genesis of civilization. It even 
                                                             
76 Prom. 736: ‘Don’t you think that the tyrant of the gods is equally violent to all (εἰς τὰ πάντα)?’. 
77 Prom. 248-254: ’Prom. I stopped men from seeing their death beforehand. Chor. How did you put a remedy 
to that illness? Prom. Blind hopes I planted in them. Chor. That is a great benefit you gave to mortals. Prom. 
Besides, I gave them fire. Chor. So, these ephemeral creatures now possess flaming fire? Prom. Indeed, and 
from it they will learn many skills’. 
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precedes fire itself, for no technical nor intellectual progress could be achieved were men not 
able to ignore the limits inherent in their ephemeral condition. Without hope, the advantages 
of fire, ‘teacher of every craft’ (διδάσκαλος τέχνης πάσης, 110-111) would soon be lost.  
     The Hesiodic legends on men’s fall (the myth of Prometheus and that of the five races) are 
constantly evoked in the Prometheus Bound, and yet the drama presents a radically different 
image of the impact of Prometheus on human life. The intervention of the Titan coincides in 
fact with the moment in which men come up from their primitive condition into the state of 
civilization. In his speech on the arts (442-506), the god offers an astonishing list of all the 
τέχναι that he has taught to human beings: writing, astronomy, farming, sailing, medicine, 
divination. Prometheus’ benefits to mankind extend to every field of human activity, but it 
cannot be a mere coincidence that his list culminates with metallurgy. This was, after all, the 
τέχνη to which Prometheus, along with Hephaestus and Athena, was traditionally 
associated in the Attic cult78. But there is another reason, which relates to the symbolic 
relationship between this specific activity and Hesiod’s world-view as expressed in his two 
myths on men’s decadence. Metallurgy signifies in fact the capacity to uncover ‘what is 
hidden below the earth’ (ἔνερθε δὲ χθονὸς κεκρυµµένα, 500-501), that is, to find out what 
Hesiod’s gods keep hidden away because of Prometheus’ transgression (κρύψαντες, WD 
42)79. Besides, metals symbolised, in the Works and Days, the successive stages of a moral and 
material decline, each of them inferior to the preceding one: gold, silver, bronze and finally 
iron. The defining aspect of the Promethean man is instead this, that each discovery is an 
improvement of what had been previously achieved:  
 
χαλκόν, σίδηρον, ἄργυρον χρυσόν τε, τίς 
φήσειεν ἂν πάροιθεν ἐξευρεῖν ἐµοῦ;80 
 
Bronze, iron, silver and gold. The list is symmetrically opposed to the Hesiodic succession 
of metal races, except that bronze, and not iron, stands at its beginning. But even this detail 
can be put in relationship with the positive image of the human condition elaborated in the 
speech on the arts. Bronze, in fact, stands generally for the ability to transform a given 
material into an artefact: it is somehow representative of τέχνη itself, which is why it must 
precede iron. What bronze embodies is the capacity to apply one’s intelligence to gain mastery 
over the surrounding reality: this is the basis of civilization, this is what enables men to 
constantly improve their technical and cognitive faculties.  
 
 
 
                                                             
78 See Cerri, 1975:48-49; Griffith, 1983:85 n. ad 14; Vernant, 1985:263-265 and Reinhardt, 1991:60-62. 
79 Even the fact that metallurgy is preceded by sacrifice (496-499) can be understood as a reversal of the 
Theogony. Prometheus’ sacrifice trick at Mekone (535 ff., see above) caused the ontological differentiation 
between gods and men, while here the institution of sacrifice is a gift: it enables men to establish a contact with 
the gods despite their ontological distance. Cf. Plato’s Protagoras, 322a: ἄνθρωπος θείας µετέσχε µοίρας. 
80 Prom. 500-503: ‘bronze, iron, silver and gold, who would claim to have discovered them before me?’. 
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Old questions, new answers 
 
      In this chapter, we have observed a process of ‘vertical anchoring’, whereby a familiar 
heritage of the past, the Hesiodic myths of Prometheus, is used as a model toward the 
development of an innovative dramatic project81. But at this point, once this heritage has been 
discussed and related to the Prometheus Bound, a further question arises, which touches upon 
Aeschylus’ approach to the traditional material. It is true that Aeschylus engages constantly 
with the issues raised by the Theogony (the relationship between Prometheus and Zeus’ 
power) and the Works and Days (the human condition), but his intellectual concerns are 
foreign to the spirit of Hesiod’s poems. What are, then, the notions and critical tools that 
enabled the tragedian to re-elaborate so radically the traditional myths? The answer lies in his 
complex engagement with the intellectual movements of fifth century Greece, with those 
notions, more specifically, that we now group under the label of ‘pre-Socratic philosophy’. It 
is my aim to bring this engagement to light, so to reveal a fundamental dimension of the text 
that can only be defined as a critical response to the wider cultural context in which the 
Prometheus Bound took shape. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
81 See Sluiter, 2017:21 ff. 
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Knowledge and civilisation 
The Prometheus Bound between Hesiod and the pre-Socratics 
 
‘Considera un poco se la tua sentenza sul genere 
umano fosse più vera acconciandola in questa 
forma: cioè dicendo che esso è veramente sommo 
tra i generi, come tu pensi; ma sommo 
nell’imperfezione piuttosto che nella perfezione.’ 
Leopardi, La Scommessa di Prometeo 
 
 
     The long speech on human civilization that occupies the central part of the drama (442-
506) is certainly one of the most striking and original features of the Prometheus Bound. Such 
originality has often been taken as the clearest sign that Aeschylus could by no means be 
the author of the drama82. Since a systematic speculation on human civilization only started 
in the second half of the fifth century, the argument goes, the discourse elaborated by 
Prometheus must be the product of a late fifth century author more familiar than Aeschylus 
could possibly be with the Sophists’ ideas on progress83. For others, on the contrary, ‘the 
speech is decidedly archaic and pretty evidently pre-sophistic‘84. The key question, when debating 
this issue, is the following: can we reduce the character of Prometheus to a merely symbolic 
function, and thus attribute to the tragedian a rationalistic approach to traditional myth? In 
other words, can we read the speech on the arts as an allegorical hymn to human 
intelligence?  
 
 
I. Is Prometheus a sophist? 
 
     The assumption that the central section of the drama elaborates a purely symbolical 
representation of human intelligence mainly rests on texts other than the Prometheus Bound. 
First of all, on the Prometheus’ myth narrated in Plato’s Protagoras, which seems to preserve 
ideas elaborated by Protagoras himself (fl. ca. 440 BCE)85 in a lost treatise On the State of 
Things in the Beginning (Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως)86. Although it is impossible to 
determine to what extent the contents of Plato’s dialogue reflect those of Protagoras’ treatise, 
it can be safely assumed that this thinker expressed, somewhere in the mid fifth century, 
specific ideas on human progress and civilization87. Griffith, an enthusiast advocate of the 
non-Aeschylean authorship of the Prometheus, claims that the tragic poet has been 
                                                             
82 For an overview on this issue, see Conacher, 1980:82-97 and Saïd, 1985:138-154. 
83 Griffith, 1977:217-221. See also West, 1979:147. 
84 Dodds, 1973a:5. See also Reinhardt, 1991:72; Saïd, 1985:146-152 and Judet de La Combe, 2010:255 n. 31. 
85 For the chronology of the author, see the introduction to Protagoras’ fragments in EGP VIII, 31. 
86 EGP VIII, 31, D1. 
87 See Dodds, 1973a:9, Khan, 1981:98 n.11 and Morgan, 2009:132-154. 
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influenced by this or a similar account on human progress88, and thus places the drama in 
the second part of the fifth century. His idea is that the tragedian follows Protagoras in 
presenting the discourse on human civilization as a display speech (ἐπίδειξις)89 elaborated 
in the form of a µύθος whose defining features – the role of fire and Prometheus – are 
consciously used as a symbolical representation of human intelligence. The symbolical 
interpretation of the Prometheus Bound has also been justified by later usages of the 
Prometheus’ myth, in which the symbolism becomes explicit. Among the scholia vetera on 
the drama, a line has been preserved from a comedy by the poet Plato (5th-4th century) 
entitled, eloquently enough, The Sophists, where it is said that ‘Prometheus is in fact the human 
mind’90. Fire, as another ancient commentator has it, would then signify the ‘knowledge 
acquirable through activity’91. It is the same allegorical procedures which Griffith attributes 
to the author of the Prometheus Bound, for whom Prometheus would represent an icon of the 
new rationalistic culture promoted by the Sophists. The fact that the god is addressed twice 
as σοφιστής (62, 944) in a derogatory sense – as attested, inter alia, in Aristophanes’ Clouds 
(331, 1111) -  has been taken as a further proof of the influence exerted on the dramatist by 
the philosophical movements of late fifth century Greece92. None of these claims, however, 
stand up to scrutiny. I will briefly resume here the reasons why this is so. 
  
 
The speech on the arts: interpretative issues 
 
     Let us start by saying that the word σοφιστής does carry, in the Prometheus Bound, a 
pejorative sense (i.e. ‘quibbler’, ‘cheat’). It is then legitimate to consider Prometheus ‘the first 
sophist of Greek literature’93, provided we do not attach to this word the connotations it will 
take up from Plato onwards94. The word, in fact, carries a negative overtone because in both 
instances it is pronounced by the opponents of Prometheus (at 62 by Kratos, at 944 by 
Hermes), and not because it relates to the historical activity of the thinkers known as 
‘Sophists’: σοφιστής points to the devious cunning attributed by Zeus’ agents to 
Prometheus. He is called ‘sophist’ not only because he has tricked Zeus, but also because he 
knows a prophecy that makes the tyrant vulnerable: σοφίσµατα are in fact the arts that 
Prometheus gives to men against Zeus’ will95, σόφισµα is the secret that will one day cause 
the tyrant to fall96.  
                                                             
88 Griffith, 1983:4. 
89 See ibid.:164 n. ad 443-444. Cf. Plato, Protagoras 320 c: ἐπιδείξω. 
90 Schol. 120d: Προµηθεὺς γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ νοῦς.  
91 Schol. 120c: ἡ γνῶσις διὰ τό δραστήριον. 
92 Griffith, 1983: n. ad 62. Cf. also Griffith, 1977:221. 
93 Saïd, 1985:12. 
94 See Groeneboom, 1928:97 n. ad 61-62; Cerri, 1975:93 and Adàn, 1999:12-13. 
95 Prom. 459, 470. 
96 Prom. 1011. 
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     As to the relationship between the Prometheus Bound and Plato’s Protagoras, it has been 
shown that the distance between the two texts is much more significant than the alleged 
proximity between them. First, because the tragedian betrays no interests in marking 
different stages of civilization, as it is instead the case in the Protagoras and in other accounts 
of human progress elaborated in the second half of the fifth century97. Only two moments 
are posited in the drama, a ‘before’ and an ‘after’: that is, a ‘beginning’ (πρῶτα, 447) going 
on ‘until’ (ἔστε, 457) Prometheus intervened. The speech on the art is, from this point of 
view, much closer to Hesiod than to the late fifth century discourses. For the intervention of 
the Titan does not imply a gradual but a sudden change, which is negative in Hesiod, but 
positive in the Prometheus Bound.  
     Different from ‘Protagoras’ is also the role assigned to Prometheus himself. In Plato’s 
dialogue, the god acts as an intermediary: he provides men with the resources necessary to 
their survival, and then disappears. At this point man takes over, and builds civilization 
through his own rational efforts (321e-322a). The Prometheus of drama, instead, is a πρῶτος 
εὑρετής, a culture-god who identifies himself with the totality of the arts: 
 
πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προµηθέως.98 
 
The dramatist presents as the gifts of Prometheus what Protagoras will present as the 
gradual achievements of civilized life. The god of the play, like in the Platonic myth, saves 
mortals and gives them reason (i.e. νοῦς and φρήν, 444), but then also shows99, reveals100 
and defines101 every practical application of such reason. An explicit expression of men’s 
own rational effort is nowhere to be found in the drama. Even the claim that men will learn 
by themselves many arts from fire (254) is an isolated episode within a play in which men 
systematically appear as the passive recipients of divine actions. After all, the invention that 
Prometheus describes at greatest length is divination (µαντικὴ, 484-495), the art that more 
than any other goes beyond the realm of human understanding and power102. Divination is 
not only related to Prometheus’ prophetical knowledge, whereby the god blackmails Zeus 
and teaches men how to know ‘what will really happen‘ (ἃ χρὴ ὕπαρ γενέσθαι, 485-485). It is 
also a prophecy that leads Inachus to expel the daughter Io from his house, so to keep his 
entire family from being destroyed by Zeus’ thunder (669-673). What the prophecy 
emphasizes is, indeed, the human helplessness in front of the divine103. In sum, the spirit of 
the play is quite far from the anthropological views reflected in Plato’s Protagoras (or, for 
                                                             
97 See Dodds, 1973a:4-10, Saïd, 1985:140-150 and Reinhardt, 1991:71. In the Protagoras, the different stages of 
civilization are signalled by different temporal adverbs: ἐπειδὴ (322 a), πρῶτον (322 a), ἔπειτα (322 a), etc. 
98 Prom. 506: ‘All the skills of mortals come from Prometheus’. 
99 ἔδειξα 458, 482; ἐγνώρισα 487; ἐξωµµάτωσα, 499. 
100 εὑρίσκειν/ἐξευρίσκειν 460, 468, 469, 475, 503. 
101 ἐστοίχισα, 484; διώρισα; 489. 
102 Cf. Griffith, 1983:173-174 n. ad 484-490. 
103 Prom. 671-672: ἅκουσαν ἅκων, ἀλλ᾿ ἐπηνάγκαζέ νιν/Διὸς χαλινὸς πρὸς βίαν πράσσειν τάδε. 
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instance, in the fragments of Archelaus and Democritus104) where the emphasis is put on 
men’s intellectual and technical faculties105.  
     In fact, we cannot expect to find in the Prometheus Bound the clear line between sacred and 
secular, between divine and human, that is drawn instead in Plato’s dialogue. In Greek 
tragedy, and most markedly in our tragedy, gods and men are part of the same history and 
constantly interact with each other. Prometheus is bound ‘because of his excessive love for 
mortals‘ (διὰ τὴν λίαν φιλότητα βροτῶν, 123), and it is a mortal who will eventually release 
him: Heracles, who descends from the lineage issued by the union between the mortal Io and 
Zeus. In this interaction lies the very essence of drama, in the paradoxical situations that the 
encounter between gods and men produces106. It remains, however, that the human beings of 
the Prometheus Bound are never agents, but only instruments whereby Prometheus and Zeus 
realize their individuality by opposing themselves to each other. The truth, in fact, is that a 
scission has been declared between the two gods, and this scission becomes universal: it 
extends into the human reality and gives it a specific shape. Once more, the scheme adopted 
in our drama is closer to Hesiod than to the Sophists.  
     There also lies a remarkable distance between the παντέχνου πυρὸς (7) of drama and 
the τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί (321d) of the Protagoras. Although fire stands in both 
works in a symbolic relationship to the τέχναι, the distinction between the materiality of 
fire and the usage of fire is absent in the first case, but carefully drawn in the latter. The 
relationship between fire and τέχνη in our drama is not metaphorical (as it is for Plato, 
where fire clearly stands for something else) but metonymic, in that the instrument overlaps 
with the arts deriving from it: this type of link between art and instrument, between cause 
and effect, constitutes a defining trait of the archaic or at least pre-sophistic thought107. 
Moreover, we need not forget that fire, which later authors will identify with human reason, 
is in our drama a prerogative of the gods, more specifically of Hephaestus108. The ‘flaming 
fire‘ (φλογωπὸν πῦρ, 253) that Prometheus gives to men stands for a know-how that is 
essentially divine: man cannot master but with the help of a god. φλογωπὰ σήµατα are also 
the oracular signs of a divine reality, of a reality, in other words, that only the Titan’s 
interpretation can make manifest. All this is to say that Prometheus’ speech on the arts 
cannot be taken as a symbolical representation of human intelligence, because this would 
forge poetical and intellectual specificities that cannot belong to the author of our play.  
 
 
                                                             
104 Cf. Khan, 1981. 
105 Let us also remember that the τέλος of Protagoras’ story is the establishment of political life, while our 
drama explores the consequences of the absence of any form of shared legality. If we assume that the myth 
narrated in the Protagoras is to some extent compliant with the Prometheus Bound, it will be for Zeus – once the 
re-conciliation with Prometheus is achieved - to endow mankind with αἰδώς and δίκη: that is, with the πολιτικὴ 
τέχνη. See above, n. 74. Cf. also Lloyd-Jones, 1971:102 and Conacher, 1980:92. 
106 Cf. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet, 1972-1986 (II):101-105 and Judet de La Combe, 2010:41-45. 
107 See Saïd, 1985:146-147. 
108 See Prom. 7, 30, 252-253. 
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Philosophy onstage 
 
     Protagoras himself, in the Platonic dialogue, draws an equivalence between λόγος and 
µῦθος (320c) (i.e. between myth and philosophy), inviting his interlocutors to translate in 
abstract terms the fictional representation of human intelligence. No trace of such distinction 
can be found in the Prometheus Bound, where ‘abstract’ and ‘fictional’ are the indivisible 
aspects of the same dramatic whole. Contrasting significances interlock, contradict and 
reinforce each other in the drama, and this, in the end, defeats the allegorical intention. Here 
lies the essential difference between the discourse of Protagoras and the play. The first 
elaborates, through the figurative language of myth, an objective theory on civilization; the 
latter explores instead the relationship between theory and the individuals who take part in 
its dramatic representation. A purely symbolical interpretation of Prometheus’ inventions 
would then keep us from grasping the tension, inherent in tragedy, between the theoretical 
content, which aims at generalizing, and the characters who appropriate this content to 
narrate their own story. Prometheus, to whom we owe the elaboration of the discourse on 
the arts, is only secondarily concerned with the nature of human civilization. His discourse 
relates in fact to a gone past (ἀκούσατε, 443), and helps shedding a light on the events 
unfolding now, onstage. The speech on the arts, in other words, provides the Titan with a 
medium to dramatize his own situation, the aporia provoked by his act of heroism: 
 
τοιαῦτα µηχανήµατ᾿ ἐξευρὼν τάλας 
βροτοῖσιν αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχω σόφισµ᾿ ὅτῳ 
τῆς νῦν παρούσης πηµονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ.109 
 
What emerges from Prometheus’ speech on civilization is not a specific picture of human 
reality, but the paradox implied by this reality, which in the end is the paradox of 
Prometheus himself. The god who has given such great devices (τοιαῦτα µηχανήµατα) to 
human beings ignores the mean (σόφισµα) whereby he could escape his bonds. He is a sick 
doctor (472-475), an imprisoned liberator who pays the gift of thought to human beings 
(φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους, 444) with the loss of his own wits (ἀποσφαλεὶς φρενῶν, 472). 
Prometheus’ affirmation of the power of the arts, in sum, overlaps and clashes with the 
painful representation of their inherent weakness. In this way, the reflection on human 
civilization retains its significance while being at the same time questioned by the individual 
who elaborates this reflection. The abstract notion is in fact part of the heterogeneous 
cultural material adjusted by the playwright to his own needs of representation. When 
brought onstage, it becomes an expressive tool. Once this defining feature of Greek drama 
is recognized, it becomes clear that the task of the interpreter is not to isolate the 
philosophical concept, but rather to investigate its tragic effects. For there is always a specific 
                                                             
109 Prom. 469-471:’ Despite having invented such contrivances for mortals, I myself am wretched, knowing no 
trick to escape my present agony’.  
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dramatic context in which the philosophical notion is used, and only within this context its 
meaning can be fully grasped.  
     To be sure, it was the author of the Prometheus Bound who paved the way for a purely 
symbolical elaboration of the myth, to the extent that he was the first to credit Prometheus 
with all the arts of civilization and suggest a functional equivalence between the god (506) 
and the rational use of fire (254). The speech of Prometheus undoubtedly betrays the 
engagement with contemporary philosophical ideas, but also reveals an intellectual and 
artistic attitude that has little in common with the late fifth 7century rationalistic odes to 
human genius. Rather, it anticipates the Sophists, providing them with a poetical model for 
their explicit theories on human culture110.  
     This means we must look elsewhere for the philosophical sources of our drama. With 
very few exceptions111, no attempt has been done to compare the speech on the arts with the 
material of the pre-Socratics, of which our drama bears an unquestionable mark, conceptual 
and literary at once. The next pages will be devoted to proving the validity of this claim.  
 
 
II. Prometheus among the Ionians 
 
     Xenophanes (570/560 – 480/470 BCE), the poet-philosopher from Colophon, was the first 
to articulate in most clear terms the idea of human progress: 
 
οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, 
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄµεινον.112 
 
These verses, based on the opposition between divine disclosures (ὑπέδειξαν) and human 
inquiry (ζητοῦντες), have long been regarded as a source for Prometheus’ speech on the 
arts113: let us consider in more detail the relationship between the two texts. 
 
 
Myth and Time 
      
     One aspect of the continuity between the drama and Xenophanes’ fragment should be 
highlighted at first, namely that both represent an answer to Hesiod’s claim that ‘the gods 
keep the resources of life hidden away from men’ (WD 42). For the author of the Works and Days, 
as we have seen above, the human condition is the result of a material and moral decline that 
                                                             
110 Cf. Capizzi, 1982:125 and Judet de La Combe, 2010:255 n.31. 
111 Adàn, 1999 and Irby-Massie, 2008:138-143. Cf. above, n. 27. 
112 EGP III, 8, D53:’Indeed not from the start did the gods indicate all things to mortals, but as they search in 
time they find something better’. 
113 Dodds, 1973a:4-6 and Kahn, 1981:103-104. For the influence of Xenophanes’ monotheism on some of 
Aeschylus’ descriptions of Zeus, cf. Rösler, 1970:14-15 and, more recently, Scapin, 2015:144 ff. 
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has in the myth of Prometheus and in that of the five races its complementary representations. 
But his pessimistic picture of the human condition cannot be any longer reconciled with the 
results yielded by contemporary scientific inquiries, which prove that man does possess the 
tools to improve his cognitive faculties and consequently his living conditions. Both the 
tragedian and Xenophanes recognize in fact that men are rising and not falling, that they 
will discover something better (ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄµεινον) and learn many arts 
(ἐκµαθήσονται, Prom. 254). In this way, two forms of public wisdom – philosophy and 
tragedy – converge, both embodying that critical attitude toward mythology that is a 
fundamental trait of the early philosophical discussions. What brings the playwright close to 
Xenophanes, in fact, is not just the content of his drama (i.e. a specific view on civilization), 
but also the procedure whereby the language of myth is retained but at the same time 
subjected to a critique that radically changes its original significance114. There is obviously a 
significant difference in tone and scope between Xenophanes’ re-elaboration of epic language 
and images - which aimed at substituting Homer’s and Hesiod’s authoritative views with his 
own - and Aeschylus’ re-interpretation of the legend of Prometheus, which aimed at 
producing a powerful tragedy. It is undeniable, nevertheless, that the two authors, as also 
Parmenides and Empedocles, establish the same relationship with traditional mythology: on 
the one hand, they explicitly challenge its language and contents with the tools provided by 
the ongoing philosophical inquiries; on the other, they adopt that very language to anchor 
their artistic and conceptual innovations.  
     It is significant, in this sense, that the first invention mentioned by Prometheus is 
astronomy, the capacity to discern the rising and setting of the stars 
(ἀντολὰς…ἄστρων…δύσεις, 457-458), to understand the logic underlying their cyclical 
alternation. The observation of the sky was not just a major trend in Ionian science, but in a 
broader sense it was one of the founding disciplines of the intellectual tradition that from 
Ionia - that is, from the researches περὶ φύσεως of Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes – 
gradually spread out into the whole of Greece and questioned the world-views elaborated 
by the archaic poets115. But the tragedian is also describing, by alluding to the cyclical 
alternation of night and day, what Xenophanes expresses in a single word: χρόνῳ, or the 
temporal frame within which men’s existence unfolds. A whole new conception of human 
history lies in this compositional gesture, which is based on the positive causal relationship 
between the regular flow of time and the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge. 
By the time when the drama was shaped, the idea of a human history developing linearly had 
in fact come to coexist with the notion of cyclicity, which figures prominently in the pre-
Socratic cosmologies. Anaximander conceived the order of nature as presided over by the 
immutable ordinance of Time - κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν116. In Empedocles’ doctrine, 
similarly, the formula περιπλοµένοιο χρόνοιο (‘within the circle of time’) indicates the 
                                                             
114 Cf. Mourelatos, 1970:39-41; Cerri, 1999:85-110; Morgan, 2000:46-88; Most, 2007 and Scapin, 2015:15-34. 
115 See Adàn, 1999:13 n. 14; Cerri, 1999:26-32 and Lesher, 2006:225-228. Xenophanes (D8-10) and Heraclitus 
(D21-D25a) attacked vehemently Homer and Hesiod.  
116 EGP II, 6, D6. See Kahn, 1960:183-193. 
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eternal cycle of Love and Strife, whose alternation is responsible for the life and death of all 
mortal beings117. The notion of linear temporality that gradually established itself by the side 
of the cyclical one is rooted in the epistemological assumptions elaborated by such thinkers 
as Xenophanes, who believed that the natural world lays open to human discovery and will 
reveal over time (χρόνῳ) its most hidden secrets. Among the sayings attributed by Diogenes 
Laertius to Thales, the legendary founder of the Ionian intellectual tradition, there is one 
which runs thus: 
 
σοφώτατον χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα.118 
 
This sentence does not actually report Thales’ ipsissima verba, but rather echoes some kind 
of proverb, a τόπος that we see reappearing in many different literary situations119. 
Prometheus himself, in our drama, answers Hermes with similar words: 
 
ἀλλ᾿ ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ᾿ ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος.120 
 
In fact, the growing old (γηράσκων) of time refers here to the timeframe of divine history, 
and to the lesson that Zeus will learn unless Prometheus is freed: the lesson of divine 
punishment. But this increasing age is also that of man himself, ultimately acquiring some 
knowledge (ἐκδιδάσκει) he previously lacked. In the Prometheus Bound, gods and men are 
submitted to the same temporal laws, whence the overlap between the time of the cosmos 
and the temporal frame of human existence. But this need not overshadow the tension, 
emerging from our drama, between two concurring notions of temporality: on the one hand 
the cyclical time of Nature (the regular alternation of night and days and the seasons; Prom. 
454-458), on the other the linear notion of human history, essential feature of an 
epistemological model based on the progressive acquisition of knowledge. 
     Such verbs as finding (εὑρίσκειν), searching (ζητεῖν), learning (µανθάνειν) and 
conjecturing’(τεκµαίρεσθαι), which are normally foreign to the poetic diction but common 
in philosophical texts from the sixth century onwards, are recurrent in the Prometheus Bound: 
this constitutes a further proof that the tragedian has re-elaborated the views on cultural 
evolution elaborated in Ionia and circulating in continental Greece during his times121. At 
the origin of such views lies the awareness that the accumulation of knowledge gained 
through rational inquiry and direct observation (ἱστορίη) is the conditio for any progress to 
                                                             
117 EGP V, 22, D73, 260. Cf. D94, 2.  
118 EGP II, 5, P17c:’Time is the wisest thing, for it brings everything to light’.  
119 For some examples, see Groeneboom, 1928:270 n. ad 981-985, Kahn, 1960:170 n. 4 and Romilly, 1968:33-58. 
Cf. also EGP II, 3, T10-13. 
120 Prom. 982:’But time, as it grows old, teaches everything’. 
121 See Herington, 1970:96-97 and Khan, 1981:103-105. On the scientific vocabulary of the Prometheus Bound, see 
also Griffith, 1977:217-221 and Saïd, 1985:83-86. 
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take place. Prometheus, whom Hesiod held responsible for men’s fall, is now an advocate 
of the Ionian intellectual revolution. 
 
 
The aim of knowledge 
 
     What we do not find in the Prometheus Bound, on the other hand, is Xenophanes’ explicit 
and precise distinction between the divine and the human sphere. The poet-philosopher 
rejected the notion of divine revelation (οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν), 
as well as the idea that gods communicate with men through a variety of signs122: divination 
was for him among the religious practices which keep mortals from achieving a rational 
perception of reality123. Whatever men discover, Xenophanes claimed, must be the result of 
their own investigation of the natural world. In the drama, each of these discoveries, including 
divination, is instead presented as a gift of Prometheus. This choice is surely due to a specific 
artistic purpose, since the playwright re-elaborated certain ideas on civilization, as seen 
above, to define the dramatic character of Prometheus and his relationship with both men 
and Zeus. But the difference between the two authors does not only depend on the structural 
and poetic specificities of their respective works. Such difference, I argue, is mainly 
epistemological. It is in fact clear that the author of the Prometheus Bound is tackling, with 
the medium of his own dramatic language, a question laying at the heart of pre-Socratic 
inquiries: what is the object of knowledge? And how can it be attained? It is equally clear, 
as we shall see, that the ideas emerging from the play draw the dramatist much closer to 
Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles than to Xenophanes. 
 
 
III. The solitude of the philosopher 
 
     Unlike later pre-Socratics, who believed they had discerned the ultimate principle of the 
physical world, Xenophanes denied the possibility for man to know the transcendent. He 
stood firm in his empiricism, claiming that whatever lies beyond the range of the senses 
cannot be made the object of objective knowledge (τὸ σαφὲς). For experience alone is 
reliable. Anything else is and will always be a mere conjecture (δόκος), a speculation with no 
proven validity124. Heraclitus harshly criticized this view, and devaluated the realm of 
experience to the advantage of the supernatural dimension that encloses and governs it125. To 
the πολυµαθίη of the empiricists the Ephesian opposed the power of νοῦς, assigning the 
negative pole of the opposition ignorance/knowledge to the realm of physical beings. Opinion 
is for him what rules over the sensible world. Parmenides radicalized this opposition, 
                                                             
122 See Lesher, 1992:154-155. 
123 EGP III, 8, D15a-b. Cf. D39. 
124 EGP III, 8, D49. See Fränkel, 1974:127-131 and Lesher, 1992:155-169.  
125 EGP III, 9, D20. 
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elaborating an ontological differentiation between the objective reality of Being and the 
transitory world of coming-to-be, which is never equal to itself and therefore does not exist. 
Understanding the cosmic order depends on κρίσις, on a rational discrimination between 
what is and what is not - ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν126. With these two thinkers, a different 
philosophical approach emerges, which differentiates itself from Ionian ἱστορίη and aims at 
grasping the invisible principle immanent in the visible order of things127. For Heraclitus, the 
sensible world cannot reveal τὸ σαφὲς, but only signs of a transcendent reality. Philosophy 
must then involve the understanding of these signs. Just like an oracle, that the philosopher 
must interpret to bridge the gap between the here and the beyond: 
 
ὁ ἄναξ οὗ τὸ µαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ 
σηµαίνει.128 
 
The oracular word (σηµαίνει), which Xenophanes considered the hallmark of irrational 
religious practices, is transformed by Heraclitus into the utterance of an intelligible power – 
the λόγος - that manifests itself in the processes of the natural world. Similarly, Parmenides 
put forth his doctrine as the revelation of a goddess who leads his pupil through the rational 
interpretation of σήµατα, the clues that bring ‘the man who knows‘ (εἰδότα φῶτα·, D1, 3) 
beyond the realm of human existence and put him in front of Being129. Mystical initiation and 
rational intuition: these are to some extent the equivalent paths toward a truth that is at once 
human and divine, individual and universal130. 
     These are, as well, the paths of knowledge merging in the personality of Prometheus, 
divine being who stands in between the prophet who knows all things in advance (πάντα 
προυξεπίσταµαι, 101) and the wise who recognizes through rational intuition 
(γιγνώσκοντα, 104) the cosmic intentionality by which the whole of reality is governed: 
 
τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔστ᾿ ἀδήριτον σθένος.131 
  
Far from resembling an empiricist like Xenophanes or a σοφιστής à la Protagoras, the 
enchained god incarnates the defining traits of the pre-Socratic intellectual, of the σοφός 
who knows, he alone, the unescapable (α-διδράσκω) force that binds the individual to the 
totality of things132. The speech on the arts, which has erroneously been regarded as an 
exaltation of human intelligence, sheds light on a type of knowledge, embodied by 
                                                             
126 See EGP V, 19, D8, 20 ff. 
127 Cf. Scapin, 2015:137-139 n.452. 
128 EGP III, 9, D41:‘The lord whose oracle is in Delphi does not say nor hides, but gives signs’. 
129 Cf. EGP, V, 19, D8, 7-8. Parmenides’ σήµατα have raised different interpretations. For Coxon (2009:314-317) 
they represent the predicates of Being. For Cerri (1999:214,219; cf. Mourelatos, 1970:21,25 n.40), with whom 
my reading agrees, σήµατα are instead the compelling argumentations about the nature of Being. 
130 Cf. Vlastos, 1952:97 ff. 
131 Prom. 105:’The force of Necessity is unescapable’.  
132 Cf. Adàn, 1999:16-18. Cf. Prom. 936: οἱ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν Ἀδράστειαν σοφοί. 
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Prometheus himself, that clearly transcends the limitations of human understanding. The gift 
of different theoretical and practical abilities (e.g. astronomy, mathematics, farming, cavalry, 
sailing, medicine) is in fact followed by the art of divination (484-495), art that Prometheus 
himself possesses qua son of Themis-Gaia. It is the Titan who teaches to men how to 
communicate with the divine and observe it in its real essence: 
 
[…] φλογωπὰ σήµατα 
ἐξωµµάτωσα πρόσθεν ὄντ᾿ ἐπάργεµα.133 
 
The traditional practice of divination is here presented as an act of spiritual cognition 
(ἐξωµµάτωσα) whereby what is obscure (ἐπάργεµα) becomes manifest. The art of 
interpreting σήµατα enables in fact to distinguish (ἔκρινα, 485) and discriminate (διώρισα, 
489) what is real from what is not, what will happen from what will not. A deductive science, 
it implies knowledge of the future through the present and the past, of the invisible through 
the visible. In this sense, it forms a diptych with medicine, an art which Prometheus places 
right before divination (479-483)134. The cognitive process implied by divination and 
medicine is enacted in the dialogue between Io and Prometheus, between the suffering 
human being and the foresighted doctor. The son of Themis-Gaia narrates to Io her past and 
future wanderings, proving her (σηµεῖά σοι τάδ᾿ ἐστὶ, 842) that his φρήν, his intellect ‘sees 
more than what is manifest’ (δέρκεται πλέον τι τοῦ πεφασµένου, 843). But Prometheus’ 
prophecy is also a medical prognosis, whereby Io can know in advance the afflictions 
awaiting her. The language of the gods, which before was ‘darkly obscure‘ (ἀσήµους 
δυσκρίτως, 662), finally acquires its significance and thus becomes a remedy against the 
sickness of human existence: 
 
λέγ᾿, ἐκδίδασκε· τοῖς νοσοῦσί τοι γλυκὺ 
τὸ λοιπὸν ἄλγος προυξεπίστασθαι τορῶς.135 
 
In the encounter with the divine, the human condition is surpassed, and the possibility is 
given to the individual to partake, despite his mortality, of a supernatural truth about what 
is unknown to the common man. Knowledge, or the power to attain it, is in fact the remedy 
against the maladies inherent in human existence136. 
 
                                                             
133 Prom. 499-500:’I opened their eyes to the signs of flame, which before were obscure’. 
134 Cf. EGP VI, 29, T14 (= Hippocrates, Regimen I, 12):’Such is divination: it recognizes the invisible in the visible, 
and the visible in the invisible, and what will be in what is’. See also Saïd, 1985:192-195.  
135 Prom. 698-699:’Speak, teach me everything! For it is pleasant, for the sick ones, to have a clear knowledge of 
the affliction that remains to be suffered’. 
136 An interesting parallel is the thaumaturgical doctrine of Empedocles, as presented in EGP V, 22, D43, 1-2: 
’The remedies for evils (φάρµακα…κακῶν), as many as there are, and cure against old age, these you will 
learn, since for you alone I will accomplish all this’. Cf. Prom. 476-482, and Irby-Massie, 2008:140-141. 
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IV. Thought and sensations 
 
     The very first gifts of Prometheus to mankind are not practical skills, but νοῦς and φρήν 
(ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους, 444), the cognitive faculties that enable men to 
understand the surrounding world. The same terms had already been brought together by 
Heraclitus (fl. 510-490 BC)137 a few decades before the dramatist, to show the lack of 
understanding - τίς αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν;138 - of those who perpetuate ignorance by taking 
the poets (i.e. Homer and Hesiod) and the mass as their leaders. Neither the tragedian nor 
Heraclitus seem to be drawing a sharp semantic distinction between the two terms139. The 
function of the juxtaposition of νοῦς and φρήν is for both mainly emphatic. In Heraclitus’ 
fragment it stresses what men lack, in the Prometheus Bound what they possess thanks to 
Prometheus, namely the faculty of thought, the fundamental instrument to grasp the 
essence of things. The Titan himself describes his intervention as producing a shift from 
mental infancy (νηπίους, 443) to rational thinking (φρονεῖν/νοεῖν)140. This is precisely what 
the pre-Socratics – not only Heraclitus, but also Parmenides and Empedocles - aimed to 
achieve, presenting their doctrines as the remedy against men’s lack of insight. Like these 
thinkers, Prometheus teaches to men the capacity to re-elaborate rationally (νόῳ) the 
manifold manifestations of reality, which at first were unintelligible to them: 
 
οἳ πρῶτα µὲν βλέποντες ἔβλεπον µάτην, 
κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ᾿ ὀνειράτων 
ἀλίγκιοι µορφαῖσι τὸν µακρὸν βίον 
ἔφυρον εἰκῇ πάντα […].141 
 
At first, men used to behave irrationally, as if caught in a perennial oneiric state (ὀνειράτων 
ἀλίγκιοι µορφαῖσι), unable of elaborating coherent thoughts because of their failure in the 
exercise of the senses. Now, the tragedian’s description of human ignorance in terms of 
blindness and deafness is not an isolated episode in the literature of the early fifth century, 
but is prepared and reiterated by previous and near-contemporary philosophical voices. The 
first is that of Heraclitus, who described men’s lack of understanding with words that are 
strikingly similar to those of Prometheus:  
 
                                                             
137 See Kahn, 1979:1-3. The resemblances between Heraclitus and Aeschylus have long been noticed: cf. 
Reinhardt, 1991:250; Adàn, 1999; 19 ff.; Seaford, 2012; Judet de La Combe, 2010:254-255, 268; Irby-Massie, 
2008:151-157 and Scapin, 2015. 
138 EGP III, 9, D10.  
139 For Heraclitus, see Kahn, 1979:175 and Diano, 2001:169-170.  
140 For the contrast between mental infancy and rationality, cf. Empedocles (EGP V, 22, D51). 
141 Prom. 447-450:’At the beginning they looked but saw in vain, they listened but could not hear, but for the 
length of their lives they did everything at random, just like the figures of dreams’. 
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τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ 
ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. 
 
ἀξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν ἐοίκασι […].142 
 
The relationship that the god establishes between himself and human beings in the drama is 
the same as the one established by Heraclitus with other men (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους) 
whom he regards as sleepwalkers: he observes men’s aimless (εἰκῇ, 450) wandering, and 
points to their perceptual ineffectiveness. Prometheus’ and Heraclitus’ descriptions of human 
life are in fact the voices of the σοφὸς who alienates himself from the mass and is thus able to 
give a universal tone to his negative characterization of human behaviour. The dramatic 
solitude of Prometheus, in other words, is also a symbol of the distance between the 
individual who knows things as they really are and the common man who is precluded from 
such a knowledge. As the metaphysical travel of Parmenides will bring the Eleatic on a road 
that is ‘removed from the path of men‘ (ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου, D4, 27), so is the Titan 
bound at the end of the world in ‘a wilderness without men‘ (ἄβροτον εἰς ἐρηµίαν, 2; cf. τῷδ᾿ 
ἀπανθρώπῳ πάγῳ, 20). What Pausanias will learn from Empedocles, similarly, will endow 
him with a superhuman knowledge about the constitutive powers of the cosmos: ‘never has 
human intelligence elevated itself further‘ (οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη µῆτις ὄρωρεν, D42, 9). In the 
drama as in these passages, the physical isolation is synonym, inter alia, with the epistemic 
distance that separates the privileged individual from the rest of mankind. 
     In fact, Prometheus describes human life in epistemic terms, in terms of a failure to grasp 
the essential relationship between the sensible world and its underlying structure. Pre-
Promethean men were deaf (κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον) and blind (βλέποντες ἔβλεπον µάτην) 
because they lacked νοῦς and thus could not grasp the invisible yet rational principle that 
manifests itself as a universal pattern of experience: 
 
κακοὶ µάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλµοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς 
ἐχόντων.143 
In order for perception to become cognition, Heraclitus says here, men need not have 
barbarian souls (βαρβάρους ψυχὰς). This means they must be able to understand the 
relevant language, i.e. the λόγος that nature speaks to them. In other words, the information 
gained in sense perception, through sight (ὀφθαλµοὶ) and hearing (ὦτα), cannot alone 
provide the means to understand the cosmos: it requires to be ‘translated’ in rational, non-
                                                             
142 EGP III, 9, D1:’But other men forget what they do when awake, just as they forget what they do when 
asleep’. EGP III, 9, D4:’They hear but do not understand, similar to deaf’.  
143 EGP III, 9, D33:’Bad witnesses are for men the eyes and ears of those who possess barbarian souls’. 
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referential terms144. Parmenides echoes Heraclitus when he has the goddess labelling his 
contemporaries as ‘deaf and blind alike, bewildered, people without judgment’ (κωφοὶ ὁµῶς τυφλοί 
τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα)145, polemic allusion to those who rely on their senses alone. For 
this approach, which aims at the accumulation of empirical knowledge (ἔθος πολύπειρον, 
D8, 3), leads inevitably to fallacious conclusions: to believe that ‘what is not’ can be - εἶναι µὴ 
ἐόντα (D8, 1): such is the communis opinio of mortals. Or, even worse, it can lead to a third 
way, namely to suppose that the one and same thing can both be and not be what it is, as 
maintained by certain schools of thought146. The exhortation of the goddess to the Eleatic 
thinker goes exactly in the opposite direction, toward the way of investigation (ὁδὸς διζήσιος, 
D6, 2) that alone is thinkable, the one that ‘is’, and that can only be understood through mental 
reasoning (κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ, D8, 5). Similarly, the first of Prometheus’ inventions following the 
gift of thought is the capacity to understand a physical phenomenon (i.e. the rising and setting 
of the stars) that is ‘difficult to discern’ (δυσκρίτους, 458) because it requires an interpretation 
that must not involve positing two contradicting causes. For this is how men, as we read in 
Parmenides’ fragment, ‘have gone astray’ (πεπλανηµένοι εἰσίν, D8, 59), by dividing 
(ἐκρίναντο, ibid. 60) light and darkness, which are in fact the same phenomenon, into opposite 
ontological figures. Human error lies in the purely perceptual interpretation of reality, which 
leads the mind astray (πλαγκτὸν νόον, D7, 6)147 by inducing it to separate physical entities 
from their real essence.  
     In the same way, pre-Promethean men lived randomly and ‘did everything without any set 
purpose’ (ἄτερ γνώµης, 456)148, for they had no concept of time nor any ‘reliable indication’ 
(τέκµαρ…βέβαιον) of the rhythm of the seasons (454-458). In other words, they were unable 
to understand the principle ordering the cyclical alternation of night and day and, in a 
broader sense, the regularity of the cosmos. Attention should be drawn here to the presence 
of the adjective βέβαιος, which conveys the idea of stability, trustworthiness and 
objectivity149. The earliest occurrence of any form of this word is found in Parmenides150:  
 
                                                             
144 On the substantial difference between sensation and knowledge, see Alcmaeon (EGP V, 23, D11): […] ὡς 
ἕτερον ὂν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι […]; cf. also the following line of Epicharmus (mentioned in the 
scholia to the Prometheus Bound, 439a, 447 = EGP IX, 43, T2): νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά. 
145 EGP V, 19, D7, 7. Cf. Empedocles’ exhortation to his disciple (EGP V, 22, D73, 252: τὴν [sc. φιλότητα] σὺ 
νόῳ δέρκευ, µηδ᾽ ὄµµασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς). 
146 EGP V, 19, D7, 8-9: οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόµισται/κοὐ ταὐτόν. This passage is specifically 
directed against Heraclitus and his followers, see Cerri, 1999:205-209. On the relationship between the two 
thinkers, see Mourelatos, 1970:240, 260-261; Cerri, 1999:40-49 and Coxon, 2009:18-20. 
147 Capizzi, 1982:125-127 has observed that the adjective πλαγκτός with the meaning of ‘wandering’ appears 
for the first time in Aeschylus’ Persae (277) – cf. Prom. θαλασσόπλαγκτα, 467; τηλέπλαγκτοι, 575. 
Parmenides’ πλαγκτὸν might derive from the dramatist: if anything, this parallelism represents a resonance 
of the poetical and intellectual milieu shared by the two poets. 
148 Cf. EGP III, 9, D74: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον µὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώµας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.  
149 Cf. also Prom. 297.  
150 Coxon, 2009:306.  
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λεῦσσε δ’ ὅµως ἀπεόντα νόῳ παρεόντα βεβαίως.151 
 
The implicit contrast is again between perceptual and intellectual (νόῳ) vision. The first 
focuses on what is erroneously believed to be present. The latter, on the contrary, gives an 
immediate and objective (βεβαίως) awareness of the absent things (ἀπεόντα): it brings them 
before us as if they were present (παρεόντα). Likewise, Prometheus presents the shift toward 
rational thinking in the form of an opposition between random action and capacity to live in 
accordance with objective principles of reality. 
     Parmenides contrasts intellectual power with the ‘eye that does not see’ (ἄσκοπον ὄµµα, D8, 
4) and the ‘deafened ear’ (ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν, ibid.). These are in fact the symbols of a research 
that, being focused on the ever-changing reality of sensible objects, is constantly deprived of 
the identity with its supposed referent: it is likely that Xenophanes, whose empiricism was 
already criticised by Heraclitus, is among Parmenides’ polemical targets152. What is implied 
by these thinkers, however, is not that the senses are valueless, but rather that they are only 
useful as an adjunct to the mind. Human beings cannot escape the spatio-temporal frame in 
which their existence unfolds, but the correct exercise of νοῦς will enable them to reduce 
the plurality of physical beings to an objective principle of unity. Empedocles, who insisted 
at greater length than his predecessors on the fundamental coordination between sensible 
perception and intellectual intuition153, advises his disciple Pausanias (and us) on this 
epistemological principle: 
 
ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσῃ παλάµῃ, πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον, 
µήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν  
ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώµατα γλώσσης, 
µήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι, 
γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει θ’ ᾗ δῆλον ἕκαστον.154 
 
Through a progression carefully built on symmetry, the poet describes the process wherein 
the sensorial act (ἄθρει…πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον) becomes an act of cognition (νόει θ’ ᾗ δῆλον 
ἕκαστον)155. The idea underlying this fragment is that the body can be an instrument of 
knowledge, provided that all its perceptual faculties (πάσῃ παλάµῃ) are coordinated to 
each other in a synesthetic effort. In fact, the exhortation to ‘observe’ (ἄθρει) the physical 
reality encompasses, under the privileged faculty of vision, the sensorial experience in all its 
                                                             
151 EGP V, 19, D10, 1:’Gaze on absent yet present things with your mind, steadily’. 
152 Coxon, 2009:305.  
153 See Iribarren, 2017:111-116. 
154 EGP V, 22, D44:’But come, observe with every palm how each thing appears, without holding more trust in 
a visual than in an auditory perception, nor preferring a resonating sound over the utterances of the tongue. 
Do no withhold your trust from any of the other limbs, however narrow is the path they afford to intelligence, 
but know in whatever way each evident thing’. 
155 The same progression from senses to thought appears in D42, 7-8: οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ 
ἐπακουστά/οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.  
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different aspects: sight (ὄψιν), hearing (ἀκουήν) and every other sense (τι τῶν 
ἄλλων…γυίων) must come together to provide the intelligence (νοῆσαι) with a clear (δῆλον) 
vision of the essential constitution of each (ἕκαστον) thing. In this way, the different 
manifestations of reality can be gathered in thought into a single objective whole.   
 
 
V. Conclusion: drama against philosophy 
 
     Each of the different conceptions of knowledge elaborated by the pre-Socratics finds its 
place in Prometheus’ speech on the arts: empirical observation of reality (Xenophanes), 
correct exercise of the senses (Empedocles), rational and intellectual intuition (Heraclitus 
and Parmenides). This is the miracle claimed by the Titan, to have elevated mortals above 
their inherent impuissance (cf. 248-251), enabling them to understand reality in both its 
empirical and transcendent dimension. And yet such claim is immediately contradicted by 
the scenic reality, for the image imposed by the dramatist is that of a doctor who cannot cure 
himself (472-475) and cannot receive any help from his patients. The victim of his own 
knowledge, Prometheus can only realize that his effort on behalf of man has proved useless. 
His personal drama, the Oceanids observe, is the drama of human life itself: 
 
τίς ἐφαµερίων ἄρηξις; οὐδ᾿ ἐδέρχθης 
ὀλιγοδρανίαν ἄκικυν ἰσόνειρον, ᾇ τὸ φωτῶν 
ἀλαὸν γένος ἐµπεποδισµένον; οὔποτε 
τὰν Διὸς ἁρµονίαν θνατῶν παρεξίασι βουλαί.156 
 
While the speech on the arts illustrates the power of Prometheus’ τέχνη through the re-
elaboration of pre-Socratic ideas and images, the choral song that follows presents, in a 
voluntarily archaic language, a picture of the human condition that emphasizes its radical 
imperfection. The paradox of Prometheus, torn between his spiritual assets and his 
powerlessness, first asserts itself as the result of a tension between the language of 
contemporary philosophy, which he himself represents, and that of traditional mythology 
adopted by the Chorus, whose despairing words reminds us of Hesiod’s version of the 
Promethean myth157. Unflinching faith in the virtues of Prometheus’ gift to mankind coexists 
and clashes with the dramatic representation of its limits. The Titan believes in fact to have 
freed men from a dream-like existence (448-449) with his ‘philosophical’ knowledge, but the 
Oceanids invite him to observe their dream-like helplessness (ὀλιγοδρανίαν…ἰσόνειρον) 
recurring to a notion, that of ephemerality (ἐφαµερίων)158, which often occurs in archaic 
poetry to connote the transitory nature of human existence - both in existential (short-liveness) 
                                                             
156 Prom. 547-551:’What help from creatures of a day? Did you not realize the weak, dream-like feebleness that 
binds the blind race of men? Never will the plans of mortals go past the order of Zeus’.  
157 Cf. especially Prom. 551 with Theog. 613 and WD 105. 
158 Cf. Prom. 83, 253, 945. 
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and cognitive (short-sightedness) terms159. No matter if the Titan has opened their eyes 
(ἐξωµµάτωσα, 499) and freed them from annihilation (ἐξελυσάµην, 235), human beings are 
still blind (ἀλαὸν; cf. τυφλὰς ἐλπίδας, 250) and hammered (ἐµπεποδισµένον) within the 
limits of their finitude. The encounter with Prometheus endows mankind with a superhuman 
knowledge, with a cure against afflictions, but at the same time reveals the essential gulf 
between immortals and mortals, between what man is and what he is not. The aimless 
wanderings of Io, the only mortal appearing onstage, are the epitome of man’s paradoxical 
existence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
159 Cf. Scapin, 2015:141-142.  
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The language of constraint 
Prometheus as a cosmological thinker 
 
One thing alone, what is wise, wants and does 
not want to be called by the name of Zeus 
Heraclitus 
 
     The tragic paradox of Prometheus may be represented as the oscillation between two 
opposite ways of envisioning his interaction with mankind. Human beings are in fact the 
object of his past deeds, but his present is what he must suffer at Zeus’ hands because of the 
transgression on man’s behalf. And his is a suffering, besides, from which mortals cannot 
save him, ‘for he who will relieve your pain [sc. Heracles] is not yet born’ (27) – to quote 
Hephaestus’ words. Within the divine world, the theft of fire is not a gift but a crime, and the 
τέχνη of the Titan – which among human beings is the name of a great intellectual and 
technical gift (506) – can by no means help him escape the dire consequences of his gesture. 
But such consequences, as we have seen in the first chapter, do not concern Prometheus alone. 
They extend to the divine community in its entirety, in that they gradually put into question 
the order of Zeus and the very fundaments of his universal power. Both the guilt and the 
punishment of the Titan, in brief, are actions with cosmic implications. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore these implications, and to situate the Prometheus Bound within a wider 
intellectual debate on the structure of the universe and the powers and rules responsible for 
its working.  
 
 
I. Myth, tragedy and cosmology 
 
     The Prometheus Bound lends itself with seductive ease to incorporating ideas and issues of 
cosmological interest. In fact, our drama stands on a different level than every other extant 
Attic tragedy, in that the gods, who normally constitute the background against which human 
action resonates, are here the main characters and form the centrepiece of the scene160. Even 
the Oresteia, which has important structural and thematic analogues with our drama161, differs 
on a point as fundamental as this: whereas the deities materialise in the last chapter of the 
trilogy, the Eumenides, because the human struggle has reached too serious proportions, the 
action of the Prometheia – of which the Prometheus Bound constitutes the first act - opens with 
a divine struggle and centres on it throughout. In both works the divine world, the very 
universe, is divided against itself, but very different is the way how the breach is respectively 
brought about. In the Oresteia, it is due to the chain of crime and vengeance taking place within 
the boundaries of the Atreid family. In the Prometheia it is the gods themselves who provoke 
                                                             
160 Cf. Herington, 1970:76 ff. and Griffith, 1983:17-19. 
161 See n. 3. 
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the rupture: the tension of the divine against itself is not seen as the consequence of human 
action, but constitutes the very core of the dramatic narrative. For even if the destiny of human 
beings lies at the origin of this tension and emerges as a prominent concern of the playwright, 
man plays no active role in the intra-divine struggle: rather, it is an instrument for the gods’ 
self-assertion within a larger cosmic plan162. This is in keeping not only with the Hesiodic 
myth upon which the distinctive subject-matter of the Prometheus Bound rests, but also with 
pre-Socratic cosmology: the place of human beings in the world is the result of a process that 
transcends their will, and that unfolds in agreement with an all-embracing logic of necessity. 
In fact, in such a mythological framework talking about the order of the gods implies talking 
about the order of the universe itself163.  
     Prometheus’ theft of fire acquires from the very start of the drama a specific political 
significance: it is an ἀµαρτία (9, 945), an ἀµπλάκηµα (112), in sum, an offence towards the 
Olympians and their establishment. It is in these terms that Power legitimates the frightful 
punishment of the Titan: such is the retribution that he must pay (δοῦναι δίκην, 9) for his 
transgression. What the early scenes of the play suggest is that everything takes place in 
accordance with Zeus’ binding and unifying will. Everything, just like in the myth narrated 
in the Theogony, seems fixed from the start. By forcing Prometheus into ‘unbreakable fetters of 
adamantine bonds’ (ἀδαµαντίνων δεσµῶν ἐν ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις, 6), the Olympians stop the 
course of things, and posit their new-established political order as the new law by which the 
whole universe is steered (νέοι γὰρ οἰακονόµοι κρατοῦσ᾿ Ὀλύµπου, 149). But unlike every 
other Aeschylean tragedy, where human politics are considered as an extension of divine 
law164, the political agents of our drama are themselves divine, and this means that there may 
be other forces above them determining the outcome of the action in which they are involved. 
In the search of these forces and its catastrophic result lies, as we shall see, an essential element 
of the action of the Prometheus Bound. In the previous chapter we have pointed out an 
undeniable continuity between the intellectual profile of Prometheus and that of such 
thinkers as Heraclitus or Parmenides. It is now time to ask what significance do the contents 
of Prometheus’ knowledge acquire within the dramatic context in which they are produced. 
 
 
On the politics of the cosmos 
 
     To the suggestion of the Chorus that Prometheus may someday be freed and be no less 
powerful than Zeus if he ceases to side with mankind (507-510), the bounded god answers: 
 
οὐ ταῦτα ταύτῃ µοῖρά πω τελεσφόρος 
                                                             
162 See above, pp.19-20. 
163 See Cerri, 1998:25-28, Algra, 1999:46 ff., and Scapin, 2015:31-34. 
164 Cf. Lloyd-Jones, 1971:93 ff. The same idea was expressed, though in different terms, by Heraclitus (EGP III 
9, D105): […] τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόµοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου […]. For the Ephesian, it is the 
law which best exemplifies the necessity to posit a single principle in which all the opposites can be reduced.  
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κρᾶναι πέπρωται, µυρίαις δὲ πηµοναῖς 
δύαις τε καµφθεὶς ὧδε δεσµὰ φυγγάνω· 
τέχνη δ᾿ ἀνάγκης ἀσθενεστέρα µακρῷ.165 
 
Here we have, as Bollack once observed, ‘a veritable lesson in active theology’166. By means of 
reflection, Prometheus posits a universal principle from which the meaning of his suffering 
can be deduced and placed within a perspective vaster than that of the Olympian order. The 
image of the god in chains takes on a meaning unknown to the Hesiodic myth: rather than 
illustrating Zeus’ wisdom and justice, it says the radical impuissance of τέχνη in front of that 
form of coercion called by the name of ἀνάγκη. Not only the art which he himself embodies 
but also the bonds (δεσµὰ) forged by Hephaestus’ savoir-faire (τέχνη, 87), though themselves 
an unsolvable constraint (ἀνάγκαις, 108), are in fact powerless in themselves when compared 
to the unescapable force of Necessity167. With his cognitive faculties, the Titan sets himself 
above the actual political struggle, so to grasp the causal patterning whereby everything is as 
it is - ταῦτα ταύτῃ. His language sounds almost tautologous here: the present asserts its 
existence merely in terms of itself, the future being already inherent in the events unfolding 
onstage – and in those which have taken place in the past. If Prometheus associates ἀνάγκη 
with the Moira τελεσφόρος, it is because he identifies her with the immanent force which 
underlies the flow of divine history, which actualizes and connects its different moments into 
a single whole. From the dethronement of Kronos, through the present of his punishment, till 
a distant future where he will be released and Justice established: each of these actions occurs 
in full accord with its own nature, which has been allotted by Destiny. The word which 
describes them can only state their inevitability, since whatever happens is all there can be. 
     In fact, Moira and Necessity are also the alternative names of the logico-metaphysical 
principle which, in Parmenides’ poem, holds Being fast ‘within the limits of its great chains’ 
(µεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσµῶν, D8, 31): here is a clear allusion to the captivity of Prometheus, 
the mythological paradigm which the Eleatic adjusted to his conceptual and poetical needs168. 
His description of Being closely resembles that of a bounded god who cannot, because of his 
immortality169, escape a torment which has been decreed to be eternally present: 
 
[…] οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται 
ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν 
οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔµεναι· […].170 
                                                             
165 Prom. 511-514: ’All-ordering Moira has not been fated yet to accomplish these things in such a way, but only 
after being bent by countless woes and torments I will escape the bonds. For Art is far weaker than Necessity’. 
166 Bollack, 2006:81. 
167 Cf. Hephaestus words at Prom. 16, 72. 
168 Cf. Mourelatos, 1970:27; Cerri, 1999:229 ff., and Coxon, 2009:327-328. The model is Hesiod: cf. Theog. 615-
616: […] ἀλλ᾿ ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης/καὶ πολύιδριν ἐόντα µέγας κατὰ δεσµὸς ἐρύκει. 
169 Prom. 933: […] θανεῖν οὐ µόρσιµον. Cf. also 93-100 and 1053: πάντως ἐµέ γ᾿ οὐ θανατώσει. 
170 EGP V, 19, D8, 41-43:’For nothing other than what is is or will exist, since Destiny has bounded it to be whole, 
motionless’.  
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Moira – or ‘mighty Necessity‘ (κρατερὴ Ἀνάγκη, D8, 35) -  as the force which binds Being (τὸ 
ἐόν) to be an absolute Totality (οὖλον), a concluded and changeless system: it is the same 
force which holds Prometheus in ‘indissoluble fetters’ (δεσµοῖς ἀλύτοις, 155). Ἀνάγκη is a 
word for the omnipotence of Fate, which is one with the inviolable law of the universe itself. 
     Constraint and savoir-faire, the poles of the opposition between the tyrant and the sophist, 
become then part of a universal question that involves understanding one’s lot (αἶσα, 104) 
within the necessary course of events. Neither Prometheus’ punishment nor his release, at 
this point, depend any longer on the decisions of Zeus. For he alone is free among the gods 
(50) and rules ‘with laws of his own making‘ (ἰδίοις νόµοις, 403), but even the political 
constriction deriving from his authority is subject to a more remote form of ineluctability: 
 
ΧΟ. τίς οὖν ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν οἰακοστρόφος; 
ΠΡ. Μοῖραι τρίµορφοι µνήµονές τ᾿ Ἐρινύες. 
ΧΟ. τούτων ἄρα Ζεύς ἐστιν ἀσθενέστερος; 
ΠΡ. οὔκουν ἂν ἐκφύγοι γε τὴν πεπρωµένην. 
ΧΟ. τί γὰρ πέπρωται Ζηνὶ πλὴν αἰεὶ κρατεῖν; 
ΠΡ. τοῦτ᾿ οὐκέτ᾿ ἂν πύθοιο· µηδὲ λιπάρει.171  
 
This exchange is the turning point of the dramatic action, as the concern for Prometheus’ 
liberation is skilfully converted into the question of the limitations of Zeus’ power. The world 
which the Titan describes, in fact, is not the one presupposed by the traditional theology: it is 
not Zeus who orders the universe and holds control of Necessity, as the Oceanids seem to 
believe, but the Moirai and the Erinyes172. It is them who steer (οἰακοστρόφος), accomplish 
(κρᾶναι, 512) and delimit the destiny of each individual within boundaries not to be 
overstepped. No less than Prometheus can Zeus escape their inexorable verdict (τὴν 
πεπρωµένην), and this is what levels the power gap between the two gods. Whether the 
tyrant will lose his throne or not, whether the curse spelled by Kronos will be ‘utterly 
accomplished’ (παντελῶς κρανθήσεται, 911), what really matters is that Zeus will need 
Prometheus in order to find out, since the Titan alone knows the secret of his ever-lasting 
sovereignty. In this way, Prometheus reveals the working of an objective law of reality, which 
supports the idea of a rational and immutable world, and at the same time produces, by 
conveying this very truth, the possibility for an unexpected action to take place. At this point 
of the drama, and after having weighed in all the forces involved in the situation, it is in fact 
the fate of the ruler that is suddenly put at stake.  
                                                             
171 Prom. 515-520:’Chor. But then, who is the ruler of Necessity? Prom. The three Fates and the unforgetting 
Erinyes. Chor. Is Zeus weaker than these? Prom. Well, he could certainly not escape his fate. Chor. In fact, what 
has been fated for Zeus if not to rule forever? Prom. You could not learn this, not even if you persist in asking’ 
172 Here is another significant innovation on Hesiod. In the Theogony, the Moirai have a double genealogy: first 
they are daughters of Night (Theog. 217-218), then they appear as Zeus’ progeny (901 ff.), i.e. as powers 
indissociably linked to his regime of justice and order. Cf. Saïd, 1985:279 n. 103. 
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     As so often in Greek tragedy, the expression of understanding - in this case Prometheus’ 
theological revelation - raises doubts rather than providing answers. For despite the 
suggested explanatory logic of events, the passage between the present and the end of the 
narrative – which in the Prometheus Bound corresponds to the τέλος of divine history itself - 
remains hidden from Prometheus’ interlocutors. Iit is a holy and imposing mystery (σεµνόν, 
521), and it is around this mystery that the dramatic action is now doomed to revolve. The 
gods of our tragedy, it is true, act in accordance with a teleology which endows their story 
with a specific meaning: the destiny of Prometheus and Zeus is already written in the plot of 
the Hesiodic myth, it does not depend on the singular events befalling them onstage. But this 
destiny - and here lies the essential difference with the Theogony and the Homeric narratives 
- is not posited nor announced a priori. On the contrary, it is obscured. It is a λόγος, to use 
Prometheus’ words, that ‘must be kept concealed’ (συγκαλυπτέος, 522). Only retrospectively, 
‘in due time’ (καιρὸς, 523), it will be possible for the other tragic characters to elucidate it, based 
on the experiences which the dramatist imposes or will impose on them. In Greek drama, as 
said in the previous chapter, the theoretical truth is in fact universal and individual, abstract 
and expressive at the same time. It cannot, in other words, be dissociated from the history of 
the individual who articulates it, and this is why everyone fails to understand Prometheus’ 
evasive λόγος. The idea of a Totality defined by specific causal laws can only be valid for 
those who are confronted with – and can grasp - the concrete working of these laws173. For the 
Oceanids, whose experience and mindset differ radically from those of Prometheus, the 
reality speaks otherwise: divine rationality is to them identical with the will of Zeus, however 
arbitrary this may look. The mystery to which the Titan alludes, then, raises an apparently 
insoluble contradiction, which implies the conjunction between two opposite and mutually 
exclusive theological conceptions: how would it be possible for Zeus, ‘disposer of all things’ (ὁ 
πάντα νέµων, 526), to hold an unlimited power and be subject to other powers at the same 
time? Once more, the dialogue between the Chorus and Prometheus leads to a dilemma, and 
one which is built upon the tension between two modes of thought: on the one hand stands 
the belief inherited from the traditional myth, which builds a universe wherein all things 
occur in accordance with Zeus’ ordinance. On the other stands Prometheus, prophet-
philosopher who knows not only the τέλος to which divine history aims (i.e. Zeus’ 
sovereignty), but also the basic principles of reality by which such τέλος can and must be 
achieved. It remains to understand the exact connotations of these basic principles, and the 
reason why Prometheus describes them in this form and not others. 
 
 
II. Prometheus among the Ionians (part two) 
 
     By placing the governance of ἀνάγκη in the hands of the Moirai and the Erinyes, 
traditional symbols of vengeance against moral transgression, Prometheus states that the 
                                                             
173 Cf. Judet de La Combe, 2010:220-221. 
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universe is governed by that very law which we find already expressed in the Coephori: the 
law of the δράσαντι παθεῖν (313), whereby every action is followed by reciprocal reaction 
and every punishment represents an exact reversal of the crime that has caused it174. This is 
true for Prometheus. It is in fact by following this logic that the dramatist shows the inventor 
of all the arts yoked into an unsolvable constraint that is itself ‘a work of art‘ (τέχνη, 87), as 
Power calls ironically the chains forged by Hephaestus175. It is by this very logic that 
Prometheus, after having taught man how to discern the alternation of night and day (454-
458), is forced, though a god, to experience the temporal laws of human existence. For the 
regular flow of Time is not only the essential condition for human history to begin. It is also 
the magistrate who determines what Prometheus’ retribution shall be: 
 
[…] σταθευτὸς δ᾿ ἡλίου φοιβῇ φλογὶ 
χροιᾶς ἀµείψεις ἄνθος· ἀσµένῳ δέ σοι 
ἡ ποικιλείµων νὺξ ἀποκρύψει φάος, 
πάχνην θ᾿ ἑῴαν ἥλιος σκεδᾷ πάλιν·176 
 
The Titan’s agony, articulated by the ever-lasting cyclicity (πάλιν) of light and darkness, 
represents the resurgence of a past that bears a specific juridical obligation: the ancient fault 
must be paid back and determines itself the nature of the compensation. The Erinyes are in 
fact ‘unforgetting’ (µνήµονές, 516), which implies that there exists a relationship of strict 
causality between action and consequence, between crime and punishment.  
     From this point of view, Prometheus’ revelation about the nature of Necessity is not new, 
since the working of retributive justice, as various scholars have observed, can be already 
found in Homer and Hesiod177. We have seen, however, that the Necessity of which 
Prometheus speaks is not merely an external force – which the archaic poetic tradition usually 
identifies with Zeus - bringing punishment on the guilty ones. It is instead immanent in the 
reality of things, and imposes the same justice on every being within it. Retribution, 
accordingly, does not relate to the violation of a norm, but is itself the norm, the alternative 
description of an all-embracing principle of order. This notion, as will be shortly shown, has 
fundamental analogues with the cosmological models of the early Ionians. It was them who 
first turned the legalistic notion of justice into a cosmic law of measure, thereby opening a 
whole new view on the structure of the universe and the role of the traditional gods within it. 
We will see that this speculative dimension, which rests on the correspondence between the 
                                                             
174 Cf. Romilly, 1968: 60 ff., and Saïd, 1985:212-220. 
175 Saïd, 1985:156-164 has analysed in detail the functioning of this logic in the Prometheus Bound. See also, on 
the notion of reversal, Vernant and Vidal Naquet, 1972-1986 (I):99-131. 
176 Prom. 22-25:’You will change the bloom of your skin, when burnt by the bright sunray. And you will be 
glad when the starry night hides the light, but also when the sun disperses again the early morning frost’.  
177 Cf. Lloyd-Jones, 1971:1-55; Saïd, 1985:233-283, Allan, 2006:9-16 and Scapin, 2015:18-31. 
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normative and the cosmic aspects of the notion of justice178, is discernible as well in 
Prometheus’ personified Ἀνάγκη. 
 
 
Temporality and the necessity of reciprocity  
 
     Like Heraclitus’ Erinyes, who keep the sun from exceeding his measures (µέτρα, D89c), 
the main function of the figures evoked by Prometheus is to fulfil the natural order of things: 
the performance of retribution is part of their role as cosmic guarantees. Heraclitus associates 
the Erinyes with Justice (Δίκης ἐπίκουροι) while Prometheus makes them the agents of 
Necessity, but there is no real difference between them in functional terms. In the incipient 
Ionian intellectual tradition, Justice and Necessity coexist as hypostases of the physical law 
which steers all things and binds them to each other, in accordance with a conception which 
sees the processes of transformation as a conflict of elemental powers within an order 
recognised as intrinsically just – that is, a κόσµος179. When Heraclitus identifies justice with 
strife (εἰδέναι χρὴ […] ἐόντα […] δίκην ἔριν, D63), the underlying idea is in fact that of a 
world governed by a universal pattern of which crime and penalty are the necessary 
complements. The conception of the cosmos as governed by a principle of order and 
reciprocity was first articulated, around the mid-sixth century, by Anaximander (between 
quotations marks is the section which presumably reports his original words180): 
ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι “κατὰ 
τὸ χρεών. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν 
τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν”.181 
Although the ‘ultimate meaning’ of the fragment is uncertain and controversial182, the outline 
of the cosmological doctrine herein developed can be easily inferred and neared to the one 
articulated by Prometheus. In Anaximander’s view, the cosmos is a harmonious realm in 
which the coming-to-be (γένεσίς) and dissolution (φθορά) of beings (τὰ ὄντα) corresponds 
to a relentless chain of mutual offence and compensation. This is what the phrase διδόναι 
δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις means, namely that the natural powers constantly render 
compensation to one another to avoid every individual prevarication and thereby preserve 
the equilibrium of all things. For whatever comes into existence does so to the detriment of 
another power: it is, by necessity, ἀδικία, and by necessity it needs to be paid back. Thus, the 
first law of nature is an inexorable lex talionis. It is in fact determined by τὸ χρεών – that is, 
                                                             
178 On the legalistic terminology adopted by the pre-Socratics, see Vlastos, 1947; Kahn, 1960:183 ff., 219-230; 
Cerri, 1999:104-105; Sassi, 2006:8 ff., and Scapin, 2015:84 ff. 
179 Cf. Vlastos, 1947:156, Kahn, 1960:219-230 and Cerri, 1999:104-105. 
180 See Kahn, 1960:166-183. 
181 EGP II, D6:’From these things birth comes about for beings, and into these things their destruction occurs 
“by necessity. For they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the ordinance of time”’.  
182 A comprehensive overview of the main issues at stake in the fragment can be found in Scapin, 2015:88-97.  
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‘the most impersonal Greek formula for Fate’183 - which in turn accomplishes the binding 
ordinance (τάξις, i.e. the amount of the punishment) which Time lays down184.  
     In Prometheus’ view, similarly, the divine world is affected by an apparently endless series 
of political successions, for there stands behind the gods an impersonal principle of 
compulsion which forces them to pay for their injustice when the hour is full185. And indeed, 
such a notion fits well the dramatic context of the Prometheus Bound. Within a universe where 
Zeus’ Justice has not been established yet, the relationship between individuals cannot be 
conceived but as a self-perpetrating chain of injustice and redressing – or ‘paying back’ 
(διδόναι δίκην, cf. Prom. 9) – of injustice. By applying the phrase ποινάς τίνειν (‘make 
amend’) to both Prometheus’ binding (112) and to Zeus’ future fall (176), the dramatist says 
exactly this, that the two gods are equal in front of the law which steers the whole universe. 
In the same way as Prometheus is serving the sentence for his injustice toward the Olympians, 
so Zeus will have someday to pay the compensation for the outrage inflicted on the Titan and 
the older gods. To put it in Anaximander’s terms, Prometheus and Zeus are doomed to pay 
retribution to each other (ἀλλήλοις) in accordance with a law which is absolutely necessary, 
immanent in the order of all things: just like Prometheus’ suffering, the fall of Zeus will take 
place κατὰ τὸ χρεών, because it must186. And it will be for Time, as in the case of Prometheus 
(see above), to determine the exact penalty of the wrongdoer. For Time is the mean through 
which justice is achieved and equality re-established, and ἀνάγκη, the equivalent of 
Anaximander’s τὸ χρεών, is the name of the cosmic agent which enforces its dispositions. 
The Zeus of the Prometheus Bound does not stand for the Law which assigns to gods and men 
their due lot, but for a force that tries to replace this Law while being nevertheless its subject. 
Hence, Prometheus says, ‘I care less than nothing about Zeus’ (938). To Power and Force, tangible 
symbols of Zeus’ political domination, the Titan opposes the insight of the philosopher, who 
alone can go beyond what is manifest and recognize the gathering of all things into the 
immutable unity of the Divine.  
 
 
III. From philosophy to myth: Zeus and the Totality 
 
     In a recent article, Sassi has shown, based on a solid epigraphic evidence, that 
Anaximander conceived the rational order of the universe in terms drawn from the conflicts 
of the contemporary polis, and in terms that could transform the dynamic equilibrium of the 
cosmos into a legislative model187. The philosophical operation carried out by Aeschylus 
stands to Anaximander in a relationship of inversion: it is the cosmological notion which is 
                                                             
183 Kahn, 1960:180. Cf. also Sassi, 2006:13. 
184 For the formula κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, I follow Sassi, 2006:15-16, who makes χρόνου an objective 
genitive – i.e. ‘in accordance with the ordinance of Time’, ‘in due time’.  
185 Cf. Prom. 981 and above, pp. 30-32. 
186 Prom. 995-996: γνάµψει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶνδέ µ᾿ ὥστε καὶ φράσαι/πρὸς οὗ χρεών νιν ἐκπεσεῖν τυραννίδος. 
187 Sassi, 2006:20-22. 
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re-elaborated to explore a political process. The universe itself, in the Prometheus Bound, is 
consciously presented as analogous to the society of the day, as a comparans for the turmoil 
agitating it. The divine characters of our drama speak in fact the normative language of 
contemporary Greece, and yet their actions unfold neither in the polis nor in a royal palace or 
a temple, but in the cosmos itself. The very first words uttered by Prometheus, when his agony 
has just begun, thematise this cosmic dimension, they give it a concrete shape: 
 
ὦ δῖος αἰθὴρ καὶ ταχύπτεροι πνοαί, 
ποταµῶν τε πηγαί, ποντίων τε κυµάτων 
ἀνήριθµον γέλασµα, παµµήτωρ τε γῆ, 
καὶ τὸν πανόπτην κύκλον ἡλίου καλῶ· 
ἴδεσθέ µ᾿ οἷα πρὸς θεῶν πάσχω θεός.188 
 
The call for witnesses (ἴδεσθε), which is in accordance with Athenian legal procedure, is here 
exceptionally addressed to the four personified Elements189 and articulated by the elemental 
province that each of them occupies: the αἰθὴρ (air), the rivers and the sea (water), the earth, 
and the sun (fire). It is a ‘cosmological’ cry, whereby Prometheus embraces the whole of 
reality in its well-defined organisation, contemplating it, as it were, from the perspective of 
the natural philosopher. But this Totality, as said above, is also the normative context in which 
the dramatic action unfolds. Transposed onstage, the natural world becomes in fact 
representative, by analogy, of that ordered system which Prometheus himself – qua son of 
Θέµις – has contributed to define, and which Zeus transgresses by inflicting him an ‘outrage’ 
(αἰκία, 93). At the very end of the drama, and because of this very transgression, the four 
elements re-appear in a state of cosmic disarray (1080-1093), taking on an antithetical 
symbolical value. Earthquakes (χθὼν, 1081), fiery (ζάπυροι, 1084) twists of lightning, air 
(αἰθὴρ) blending with sea (πόντῳ, 1088): such is the concrete (ἔργῳ, 1080)190 representation of 
the all-encompassing yet destructive force of Zeus’ thunder (βροντή, 1083)191.  
     Now, these two passages are as majestic as they are puzzling, in that neither the invocation 
to the four elements as a group nor their chaotic representation at the end of the tragedy has 
parallels in Greek drama. This has led to an interpretative dichotomy: do these verses reflect 
a popular or a philosophical, maybe Empedoclean, belief?192 In truth, the two options are not 
mutually exclusive but complementary. The ideology of the four elements had been operating 
                                                             
188 Prom. 88-92: ’O bright sky and swift-winged winds, and river-springs and countless smile of the sea-waves, 
and earth, mother of all, and I call upon the all-seeing orb of the sun too: behold me, what I suffer at the hands 
of the gods though being myself a god’. 
189 As already observed by the scholiasts (schol. 88b): µεγαλοφυῶς δὲ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ἐπικαλεῖται. 
190 ‘Concrete’, because it fulfils the provocative words pronounced earlier (1043-1052) by Prometheus himself.   
191 Once more, the model is Hesiod, namely his description of the cosmic reversal following the battle between 
Zeus and the Titans (Theog. 687 ff.). See the relative comments of Iribarren, 2017:82-84.   
192 The two extremes, as is often the case in debates over the Prometheus Bound, are represented by Griffith, 
1978:113-116., who denies any philosophical influence, and Herington, 1963:190 ff., who affirms the influence of 
Empedocles’ four-elements doctrine. Irby-Massie, 2008:144-148 adds very little to the debate. 
51 
 
long before the pre-Socratics and deeply influenced their thought, but this need not 
overshadow the process of conceptual re-elaboration to which these thinkers subjected it193. 
In sum, it is only by drawing attention to the philosophical innovation of the time and to their 
anchoring in previous traditions that we can understand the tragedian’s surprising choice. 
 
 
A brief history of the four elements  
 
     The tendency toward the identification of the primary elements, those very elements that 
the pre-Socratics will later theorize, is well rooted in the cultural traditions of archaic 
Greece194. The Homeric poems, for instance, present different divine and human characters 
invoking the elements as µάρτυροι of their oath195. The invocation of Prometheus, who calls 
upon air, water earth and the all-seeing sun (πανόπτην, 91) recalls the passage (Il. 3, 276-280) 
where Agamemnon summons as guarantors of his promise Zeus (i.e. sky), the sun ‘who sees 
and listens all things’ (ὃς πάντ᾿ ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ᾿ ἐπακούεις, 277), rivers (water) and earth. 
The invocation motif, the same we find in the Prometheus Bound, was re-elaborated by 
Empedocles, who invites his disciple Pausanias to take the four elements as a confirmation 
(ἐπιµάρτυρα, D77, 1) of the veracity of his physical doctrine. Sun (fire), air, rain (water) and 
earth (3-6) are the eternal forces which, being driven by the alternating action of Love and 
Strife, create the phenomenological world, which at last will be reduced in the immutable 
unity of the Σφαῖρος (cf. D87-D93). That is, the first phase of the cosmic cycle, wherein the 
four elements are blended into a single, indistinguishable whole196. Empedocles transposes 
the traditional four elements on a cosmogonic level, to account for the principle 
underpinning the cyclical processes of the natural world. The similarity with our drama is 
in this case purely formal, in that the two authors re-elaborate the same motif, but their 
purposes are radically different. The Sicilian thinker describes the universe we observe: the 
Homeric and Promethean all-seeing sun is for him ‘warm to see‘ (θερµὸν ὁρᾶν, D77, 3), an 
object of contemplation rather than a measure against violation. Prometheus’ calling, on the 
other hand, involves not the ritual oath but the transgression of the political space which the 
four elements themselves delimit and define.  
     Other passages of archaic literature attest the four-elements doctrine outside the limits of 
the ritual convention, with a more explicit cosmological intent. We might recall Achilles’ 
shield, on which Hephaestus recreates the world in its four zones (Il. 18, 483-485): 
 
He moulded the earth (γαῖαν) on it, and the sky (οὐρανόν) and the sea (θάλασσαν), 
and the tireless sun (ἠέλιόν) and the full moon (σελήνην), 
                                                             
193 Empedocles was surely the most famous exponent of the four-elements doctrine, but traces of the idea can 
be found elsewhere in pre-Socratic literature, e.g. Heraclitus, D86 or Anaximenes, D3. 
194 See Cerri, 1998. 
195 E.g. Il. 3, 103-107; 14, 271-280; 15, 36-38 (= Od. 5, 184-186); 19, 257-265. 
196 See Bollack, 1965-1969 (I):33 ff.; Cerri, 1998:21 ff. and Iribarren, 2017:116-119. 
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and all the constellations (τὰ τείρεα) by which the sky is crowned. 
 
We find here the same elements and elemental provinces of the Prometheus Bound: earth, sky 
(i.e. air), sea and fire, this latter embodied by all the heavenly bodies that man can observe.       
    Fundamental for our analysis, in virtue of its cosmo-political resonances, is the Homeric 
description of the repartition (δασµός) of the world in different regions (Il. 15, 187-195), each 
of them corresponding to the τιµή (189) attributed to the three sons of Uranus: Zeus inherits 
the sky and the αἰθὴρ (i.e. fire), Ades the ‘cloudy darkness‘ (ζόφον ἠερόεντα, 191; i.e. air) and 
Poseidon the sea. To these three areas the earth is added as the domain shared by all of them 
(193). The hereditary division of the world is in four parts, and each of them represents, as in 
the Prometheus Bound, a specific elemental province. The descending order – from sky to 
Underworld - is here representative of the Olympian hierarchy: Zeus occupies the highest 
region because he is ‘much stronger in might’ (βίῃ πολὺ φέρτερος, 165) and ‘elder in birth’ 
(γενεῇ πρότερος, 166). The same assumption underlies the Theogony, where it is Zeus himself 
who performs  - as seen in the first chapter - the repartition of honours among the gods. 
Although Hesiod presents this action in political rather than cosmological terms, it remains 
that Zeus’ power is uppermost in the divine world. The assimilation between divine and 
cosmic puissance, which implicitly lurks in the Homeric text, was made fully explicit by 
Empedocles, and not without consequences on the traditional Pantheon: 
 
τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώµατα πρῶτον ἄκουε· 
Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Ἀϊδωνεύς 
Νῆστίς θ’, ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωµα βρότειον.197 
 
Here the four roots (ῥιζώµατα) are associated with the divine entities of myth: Zeus is fire, 
Hera is earth, Aidoneus is air and Nestis is water198. The attribution of specific honours and 
spheres of influence to each of them - τιµῆς δ᾽ ἄλλης ἄλλο µέδει (D73, 259) – recalls the 
traditional theme of the δασµός (see above), except that the divine name is now consciously 
associated with the cosmic entities underpinning the order of the natural world. The four 
elements are in fact strictly equal among themselves in terms of age and power (D73, 258), 
and this is what ensures a perpetual balance under the reciprocal work of Νεῖκος and 
Φιλότης, themselves equal to each other and to the elements199. With his symbolical re-
elaboration, Empedocles somehow levels the traditional Olympian hierarchy, wherein an 
indisputable superiority was accorded to Zeus. Unlike the divine realm of Hesiod and Homer, 
the world conceived by Empedocles is a unity whose balance depends on the proportional 
distribution of powers among its components. This assumption underlies Alcmaeon’s notion 
of the health of human body as the ‘equal distribution of powers’ (ἰσονοµίαν τῶν δυνάµεων, 
                                                             
197 EGP V, 22, D57: ‘Hear at first the four roots of all things: lightening Zeus, and life-giving Hera and Aidoneus, 
and Nestis, who moistens with tears the mortal spring’.  
198 For the correct identification of god and element, see Cerri, 1998:17-21.  
199 Cf. Vlastos, 1947:158-161 and Bollack, 1965-1969 (III):72-73. 
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D30), its sickness being the ‘domination of one‘ (µοναρχίαν, ibid.). It is on this very assumption 
that Prometheus seeks throughout the play to make his interlocutors conscious of the limits 
inherent in Zeus’ power. The universe which he contemplates (88-92) is in fact the one which 
the pre-Socratics – starting with Anaximander - had theorized. It is an ordered system in 
which opposing powers hold each other in check: whoever gets to dominate will eventually 
be dominated, whoever oversteps the right measure will eventually recede to the place which 
Destiny has assigned him. The cosmic reversal provoked at the end of the drama indicates the 
disruption of such order. It signifies the return to a primordial state of the universe from 
which a new world and a new political order will emerge. Zeus will not fall, but will take off 
the mask of the tyrant: his destiny is to become one with the Divine, the universal dispenser 
of Justice. 
 
 
Conclusion: tragedy and the cosmos 
 
     The shift from a hierarchical to a homogenous distribution of powers is among the essential 
differences between the cosmos of the epic tradition and the κόσµος of the pre-Socratics: the 
first is based on Zeus’ undisputable supremacy, the latter on the cyclical equilibrium of its 
conflicting parts200. In the Prometheus Bound, we have seen, the opposition between the two 
models is explicit. The clash between Prometheus and Zeus is one which affects the universe 
in its entirety, and which leads to an irreversible transformation of its inner structure. In fact, 
Herington was right in observing that in the Prometheus Bound we have ‘a new and very 
transitory art form, one that both destroys and constructs the universe’201. To be sure, the primary 
purpose of the dramatist is not to describe the origin and processes of the cosmos. What we 
observe onstage, rather, is their symbolic re-enactment. At the heart of our tragedy lies in fact 
a conflict between two different normative systems, the Titanic (ἰσονοµία) and the Olympian 
one (µοναρχία), but a conflict articulated by the coming-to-be and dissolution of the physical 
world. Prometheus and Zeus are the craftsmen of this spectacle. Like Love and Strife, the 
cosmic powers of Empedocles’ philosophy, they exert alternately their control on the 
elemental deities, acting with a complicity which undoes and yet complements each other’s 
work. It is their reciprocal action which makes it possible for a new cosmos to arise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
200 Cf. Vlastos, 1947; Kahn, 1960:186 ff., 222-230 and Scapin, 2015:86 ff. 
201 Herington, 1970:87. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
     In this thesis, I endeavoured to investigate the relationship between Attic tragedy and 
pre-Socratic philosophy. Modern scholarship has often kept these two intellectual practices 
apart because of an alleged incompatibility between tragic performance and philosophical 
discourse. We are now in a better position to advocate an alternative approach. One of the 
essential traits of early Greek culture is the dialogue between µῦθος and λόγος, between 
mythopoeic and theoretical modes of enunciation. In fact, this very dialogue constitutes the 
animating force of the Prometheus Bound. Our drama consists of a series of vignettes in which 
Prometheus ponders with different interlocutors the meaning of his situation. He comments 
upon the myth to deduce its logic, and in so doing he questions its theological and ethical 
foundations. We have approached the play as a document recording some of the intellectual 
debates of the day. It has emerged that such debates are not merely recorded, but re-enacted. 
The Prometheus Bound has often been mistaken for a product of late-fifth century Sophistic 
movements: on the contrary, it represents an invaluable mirror of the dynamic state of early 
fifth century Greek culture.  
     As a work of art centred on the enactment of a mythological saga, our drama is largely 
indebted to the material of the archaic, mostly Hesiodic, poetic tradition. The themes and 
conceptual issues addressed by the dramatist are in fact the ones on which the author of the 
Theogony and the Works and Days had already focused. By narrating the vicissitudes of 
Prometheus, his relationship with Zeus and mankind, Hesiod expressed a specific vision of 
the world and of human history: the myth was his instrument to rationalise and interpret 
the surrounding reality. The play’s indebtedness to these poems relates not only to specific 
characters and images, but also to the values and beliefs therein deposited. The challenge, 
for the tragedian, was to re-elaborate this complex material in accordance with his artistic 
needs and with the modes of thought of his days. It is the same challenge which the pre-
Socratics had to face when adopting old mythemes in order to elaborate new doctrines in 
and through them. In fact, the Prometheus of our drama resembles the early Greek thinkers 
in two significant ways. The first concerns the comprehensive aspiration of his knowledge. 
Prometheus is he who describes, like a theologian or a natural philosopher, the law which 
steers the Totality of things. His relegation to a distant desert is part of the punishment 
imposed on him, but might also be understood as a symbol of the epistemic distance 
between himself and the other characters of the play. The ambiguity and uncertainty 
pervading the drama are the result of this distance, which opposes the insight of the 
philosopher to the notions inherited from the archaic tradition. The second essential feature 
which brings Prometheus close to the pre-Socratics is precisely the critical approach toward 
these notions. It is on this approach - which aims at unravelling the limits inherent in the 
old picture of divine and human nature - that the action of the Prometheus Bound rests. In the 
Theogony, τέχνη (or µῆτις) – i.e. savoir-faire or ruse – is the mean through which divine 
history can advance toward its established end. The same is true for the Prometheus Bound. 
Except that τέχνη stands here for a purely epistemological rather than practical asset. It is 
synonym with knowledge itself, and implies realizing that every event of the world, even 
Zeus’ sovereignty, is produced by the unescapable decree of Necessity. 
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